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INCOME TAX ON GAINS AND LOSSES IN

LITIGATIONt
WILLIAM

T.

PLUMB, JR.*

DEAR SIR:

I am an average lawyer with a broad general practice. I make no pretense
of specializing, least of all in that labyrinthine field, taxation. But frequently
my clients ask me questions of tax law connected with their cases. Successful
plaintiffs want to know whether their recovery is taxable income, and, if so,
whether it is taxable in the year the claim arose, or when they got a verdict,
or when they won on appeal, or when they finally collected. Defendants who
have received income or property, their right to which is questioned, want to
know whether they must report it as income when received or may hold it in
suspense until their right to it is determined. Defendants who have lost want
to know whether they may deduct the loss from their taxable incomes, and, if
so, when. And all of them want to know whether they may deduct the
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation.
Although I am not a tax lawyer, I feel that I ought to be equipped to advise
upon these questions which are so intimately connected with the cases I handle.
Furthermore, in many instances, by a proper selection of the relief to be
asked, by insisting upon an apportionment of lump sum settlements covering
diverse causes of action, by itemizing my fees so that personal and business
services may be segregated, and in other ways, I may assist my client in
making legitimate tax savings.
Please advise.
Jo0N SMITH.
DEAR MR. SMITH:

1. Plaintiffs
a. If Taxable
The average taxpayer who is at all capable of preparing his income tax
return knows that (with certain well defined exceptions such as gifts, inheritances, life insurance, and the interest on certain bonds') he must report'
as income virtually all the money or property that he receives or, if he reports
income on the accrual basis, that becomes due to him. 2 But when he receives
or accrues income from an unusual source, such as litigation, he is perplexed,
tThe deductibility of judgments against the taxpayer, and other tax problems of
defendants, together with the deductibility of attorneys' fees, will be considered in Part
Two, which will appear in an early issue.
*The views expressed herein are entirely those of the writer, and nothing herein
contained is to be construed as the official opinion of the Treasury Department.
'Internal Revenue Code § 22 (b).
MRespecting the cash and accrual methods of accounting, see infra notes 109 and 118.
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and he naturally turns for advice to the attorney who secured it for him. 3
Under the Internal Revenue Code, tax is assessed upon income "derived
from any source whatever".4 But this must be read in connection with the
concept of "income". 5 The Supreme Court at an early date defined income as
"the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided
it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets". 6 If a receipt falls within this definition, it is taxable. If it merely
replaces preexisting capital (no profit resulting), or if it is a mere voluntary
transfer of existing wealth, it is not taxable as income.
The application of these principles to judgments and settlements gained
by successful plaintiffs is not free from difficulty. The basic consideration
always is, "What was the award ... or portion of the award made in respect
of ?"7 Only if it would have been income if voluntarily paid, is it income
when obtained through litigation.8 This is, of course, equally true whether the
litigation goes to final judgment or is compromised, and the two will be treated
indiscriminately herein. 9
The simplest question, of course, concerns ordinary debts and receivables,
which may be treated exactly as if voluntarily paid, the only effect of the
litigation being to postpone accrual. 10 With respect to such items, there must
first be a return of the capital elements they contain, e.g., the principal of a
loan. The balance is income."The proceeds of the ordinary action for breach of contract are income. This
is true whether the damages represent lost anticipated profits' 2 or merely
reimburse expenses and losses sustained by the plaintiff in performing his
side of the contract. 13 For, in the latter case, assuming that the expenses were
'Owing to limitations of space, it has frequently been necessary to oversimplify statements of the applicable law, but it is hoped that this article will prove useful for ready
reference.
"Internal Revenue Code § 22 (a).

'See the discussion of this concept in 1 PAUL

AND MERTEN'S, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME

(1934) ch. 5. And see note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1072.
'Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 287 (1920). The definition is a
combination of the holdings of two earlier cases. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,
231 U. S. 399, 415, 34 Sup. Ct. 136 (1913) ; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, 247 U. S. 179,
185, 38 Sup. Ct. 467 (1918).
1G. C. M. 9210, X-1 C. B. 129, 130 (1931). The abbreviation "C. B." stands for the
Cumulative Bulletin (Internal Revenue rulings).
'The effect of litigation in changing the year in which income is taxable will be considered presently. See infra p. 241 ff.
"'The results of a compromise of rights, the proceeds of which are not taxable, do not
become taxable because the compromise was brought about by an agreement not to
litigate."
Magruder v. Segebade, 94 F. (2d) 177, 179 (C. C. A. 4th 1938).
"0See infra p. 241 ff.
=Cf. G. C. M. 9210, X-1 C. B. 129 (1931).
"Herman J. Sternberg, 32 B. T. A. 1039 (1935).
"Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931) ; GrahamBumgarner Co., 11 B. T. A. 603 (1928); Dexter Sulphite & Paper Co., 23 B. T. A. 227
(1931); Newman & Carey Subway Construction Co., 37 B. T. A. 1163 (1938).
Such damages are not taxable if the recovery is for wrongful impairment of the value
TAXATION
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incurred in prior years, they were properly deductible and presumably were
deducted in the earlier years. 14
Since there are special provisions and limitations with respect to the taxation
of capital gains '--gains derived from the sale or exchange of capital assetsit is important to consider whether damages recovered from one who has
breached a contract to purchase capital assets are capital gains or ordinary income. Such damages have been held to be ordinary income. The payments
are not made because of the disposition of capital assets but because of the
failure to complete the disposition, and the taxpayer's capital assets are
unchanged.'6
Damages on account of loss of anticipated profits are taxable as income,
just as would be the profits for which they are a substitute.' 7 Thus, as
I8
already indicated, damages covering lost profits upon a contract are income.
Damages for breach of a contract not to compete, if they represent lost profits
rather than injury to good will, are taxable.' 9 Mesne profits recovered in a
contest over the title to land are also subject to tax.20 Similarly, recoveries
for torts causing loss of profits are income. The cases have so held with
respect to damages for interference with a business,21 for violations of the antitrust acts,2 2 for discrimination by railroads, 2 3 for unfair competition, 24 for
lost profits resulting from deprivation of the use of property,25 and for the
use by a competitor of designs stolen from the taxpayer, resulting in a loss
of business. 26 A judgment against a trustee who improperly disposes of trust
property, resulting in a loss of profits, is likewise taxable.2 7 Damages reof property pending completion of a sale thereof; the recovery then is merely a return of
capital, reducing the cost basis of the property. Henri Chouteau, 22 B. T. A. 850 (1931).
"-The recovery is taxable even though the taxpayer, as a result of net losses in the
prior years, gained no benefit from the deduction of the expenses. Buret v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., supra note 13. See infra note 66. Regulations 101, art. 42-4 (1939) permits
the "long-term contract" method of accounting, for certain types of contracts, under
which it is possible to report all income and expenses arising from the contract at the
time it is completed. Nevertheless, a recovery of damages, covering losses and expenses,
is income at a later date if not recovered during the term of the contract. Newman &
Carey Subway Construction Co., 37 B. T. A. 1163 (1938).
'Internal Revenue Code § 117.
"0A. M. Johnson, 32 B. T. A. 156 (1935).
'See

1 PAUL

AND MERTENS, LAws OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION

(1934) § 6.48. Note

(1936) 101 A. L. R. 1453.
'Herman J.Sternberg, 32 B. T. A. 1039 (1935) ; Swastika Oil & Gas Co., 40 B. T. A.
797 (1939).
"Armstrong Knitting Mills, 19 B. T. A. 318 (1930).
'Charles
P. Hewes, 2 B. T. A. 1279 (1925).
21
H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
- Commercial Electrical Supply Co., 8 B. T. A. 986 (1927).
'Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. Helvering, 72 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
"Armstrong Knitting Mills, 19 B. T. A. 318 (1930).
'Cf. Miller v. Hocking Glass Co., 80 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 6th 1935), cert. denied, 298
U. S.659, 56 Sup. Ct. 681 (1936) (use and occupancy insurance) ; 0. D. 645, 3 C. B. 89
(1920) (same) ; Regulations 101, art. 112 (f) - (same).
'Banta Refrigerator Co., 15 B. T. A. 1038 (1929).

"Charles S.Davis, Trustee, 35 B. T. A. 1001 (1937), re'd on other grounds on re-

hearing, 37 B. T. A. 587 (1938).
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covered in a suit for the infringement of a patent are income subject to tax.28
The fact that the losses which the taxpayer suffered from the injury are
greater than the damages so recovered will not convert the income into a deductible loss. 29 ' Since the anticipated profits were never received and never
taxed, they cannot be deducted as a loss; and the smaller profits, when they
are received, through litigation, are taxable.30
If the claim is not for anticipated profits of which the taxpayer has been
deprived but is for an accounting of profits made by a wrongdoer, the taxability of the recovery is not so clear, for there is some inconsistency in the
cases. It is settled that, in a patent infringement suit, the fact that the taxpayer elects to demand an accounting of the infringer'sprofits does not alter
the taxability of the proceeds. 31 But where a faithless officer, agent, or other
fiduciary is sued for an accounting of profits made by him in violation of his
fiduciary duty, it has been held that the proceeds are not income derived from
the -taxpayer's labor or capital but are in the nature of a penalty or windfall,
a gratuitous transfer decreed by the court in order to discourage breaches of
trust3 2 The cases are apparently distinguishable in that, in the former cases,

the patent infringer earned the profits by the use of the taxpayer's capital
(the patent), whereas in the latter case he did not. In those situations where
the profits so accounted for are taxable to the plaintiff, the fact that the
33
defendant had previously paid a tax upon them is of no avail to the plaintiff.
The defendant received the profits under a claim of right and paid the tax for
his own account, not on behalf of the plaintiff.34
'United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936);
Comm'r v. S. A. Woods Mach. Co., 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 1st 1932), cert. denied, 287
U. S. 613, 53 Sup. Ct. 15 (1932) ; W. W. Sly Mfg. Co., 24 B. T. A. 65 (1931) ; Estate of
Of course, if the plaintiff, as part of a
G. A. E. Kohler, 37 B. T. A. 1019 (1938).
settlement, releases his rights to the patent, he is entitled to recover their cost basis, if any,
from the proceeds, and to the extent that the gain is attributable to the sale rather than
to lost profits, it is taxed as a capital gain under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Estate of G. A. E. Kohler, supra.
'Banta Refrigerator Co., 15 B. T. A. 1038 (1929) ; J. R. Knowland, 29 B. T. A. 618
(1933).
'Failure to receive expected income is not a loss. Comm'r v. John Thatcher & Son,
76 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) ; S. M. 2285, 111-2 C. B. 87 (1924).
'eUnited States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936);
W. W. Sly Mfg. Co., 24 B. T. A. 65 (1931) (full discussion).
'Central R. R. of N. J. v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 697, 101 A. L. R. 1448 (C. C. A. 3d
1935). The case has twice been criticized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Sterling v. Comm'r, 93 F. (2d) 304, 306 (1937) and Lyeth v. Hoey, 96 F. (2d) 141, 143
(1938). However, the reversal of the latter, in 305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155 (1938),
which also weakens the foundations of the former case (on which certiorariwas denied,
303 U. S. 663, 58 Sup. Ct. 829 [1938]), may detract substantially from the force of those
criticisms.
'Central R. R. of N. J., 29 B. T. A. 14, 22 (1933), rez'd on other grounds, 79 F. (2d)
697 (C. C. A. 3d 1935) ; 0. D. 26, 1 C. B. 67 (1919).
3'The defendant wLs taxable upon the income when received under claim of right
and without restriction upon its disposition, and may deduct a loss when it is determined
that he must give it up. See infra p. 249 and Part Two.
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Care must be taken to distinguish payments for injury to good will, which
are regarded as a mere reparation for lost capital, not as compensation for
profits. The courts incline to look to the complaint, and if the relief asked
consists of damages for injury to good will rather than for lost profits, the
recovery is not taxable; if the suit is compromised, the settlement likewise is
regarded as covering just what was sued for, at least in the absence of other
evidence. 35 In a lawsuit of any magnitude, a lawyer should consider these
cases, among the other factors bearing upon the question of what relief to seek.
When a judgment or a settlement compensates a plaintiff for an injury
to capital or for a conversion thereof, it is not taxable income. Thus, damages
for a trespass causing injury to land 30 and for an injury to the good will of a
business 7 have been held not taxable. And when a tenant or other person
using plaintiff's property pays damages for the breach of his obligation to keep
the property in repair, the compensation is regarded as restoring the lost
capital value.38 The same has been held of a recovery for breach of contract,
representing wrongful impairment of the value of property pending completion
of a sale thereof. 39 ,
Nevertheless, to the extent that a cost basis that is not wholly speculative
can be assigned to the property or portion thereof which has been taken or
destroyed, 40 a gain may be computed upon the compensation received just as
'Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 6th 1932) (damages

to good will) ; Armstrong Knitting Mills, 19 B. T. A. 318 (1930) (Board determined
from allegations of damage that lost profits were sought). Cf. also Henri Chouteau, 22
B. T. A. 850 (1931).
'Strother v. Comm'r, 55 F. (2d) 626, 632 (C. C. A. 4th 1932), aff'd on other grounds,
287 U. S. 308, 53 Sup. Ct. 150 (1932).
'Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 6th 1932).
'Tenant's failure to keep in repair: see Comm'r v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 63 F. (2d)
304, 306 (C. C. A. 4th 1933) ; Washington Fireproof Bldg. Co., 31 B. T. A. 824 (1934).
Failure of Government properly to maintain railroads during its operation of them:
Tunnel R. R. v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 604,
607, 53 Sup. Ct. 396, 398 (1933) ; Comm'r v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 63 F. (2d) 304
(C. C. A. 4th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 672, 54 Sup. Ct. 91 (1933) ; Chicago & N. W.
Ry. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 61 CC. C. A. 7th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 672, 54 Sup. Ct.
90, 91 (1933) ; New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 956 (App. D. C.
1934) ; Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) ; Kansas City So.
Ry. v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 8th 1935) ; Ann Arbor R. R. v. Comm'r, 97 F.
(2d) 343 (C. C. A. 6th 1938). The variations and apparent conflicts among these cases
result from the peculiarity of railroad accounting that capital expenditures for repairs are
deductible as ordinary business expenses, so special problems arose respecting the
extent to which such expenses, when made on account of prior undermaintenance, had
already been reimbursed by the Government. For our purposes, however, the significant
point is that such awards are not income.
'Henri Chouteau, 22 B. T. A. 850 (1931).
101n Strother v. Comm'r, supra note 36, a trespasser had taken coal and then destroyed
the entries, so that the amount of coal taken could not be determined. Since there was no
way of determining whether the amount received in settlement exceeded the depletion
allowable on the unknown quantity of coal taken, the gain was held to be entirely
conjectural and not taxable. The Board of Tax Appeals, 18 B. T. A. 901 (1930), had
taxed the entire award, placing the burden upon the taxpayer to show that there was any
cost basis for the coal taken.
The formula for determining the cost basis of an ascertainable portion of a unit of
property is given in Harry Johnson Grant, 30 B. T. A. 1028 (1934).
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upon a voluntary disposition of the property. 41 Of course, the cost basis must
first be recovered before any taxable gain is realized, and this although by the
terms of the award a part is denominated "interest", if in fact the total does
not cover the cost.4
But it is possible for the taxpayer to avoid a tax upon this gain, where the
conversion of his property into cash is not voluntary but results from its
complete or partial destruction, or from theft, seizure, or the exercise of the
power of eminent domain (or the imminence thereof).43 He must "forthwith"which means, not "immediately", but "as soon as by reasonable exertion
'Lehigh & Hudson River Ry. v. Comm'r, 36 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 2d 1929), mod. on
other grounds, 38 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 748, 50 Sup.
Ct. 353 (1930) (Government took supplies of railroad in 1918, paid 1920 prices for failure
to restore like quantity in 1920) ; Helvering v. Gulf, M. & N. R. R., 71 F. (2d) 953 (App.
D. C. 1934), affd on other grounds, 293 U. S.295, 55 Sup. Ct. 161 (1934) (same) ; Acme
Land & Fur Co. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th 1936) (compensation for
property having no cost to taxpayer); Washington Fireproof Bldg. Co., 31 B. T. A.
824 (1934).
The courts do not appear to have considered the question whether such gains are
taxable as ordinary income or as capital gains (Internal Revenue Code § 117). Since
a "sale or exchange" is required to make the capital gains provision applicable, it is
apparent that a recovery for injury or destruction of capital is not such. On the other
hand, an involuntary sale upon condemnation falls within the "capital gains" provision.
Seaside Improvement Co. v. Comm'r, 105 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. denied, 60
Sup. Ct. 263 (1939). Quaere, whether the proceeds of an action, in the nature of trover
or assumpsit, for the value of property wrongfully seized or converted, would be considered
as derived from an involuntary sale. Cf. Conn'r v. Freihofer, 102 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A.
3d 1939).

4'Drier v. Helvering, 72 F. (2d) 76, 63 App. D. C. 283 (1934) ; Comm'r v. Speyer, 77
F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.631, 56 Sup. Ct. 155 (1935) ;
Helvering v. Drier, 79 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 4th 1935). This principle applies where
the entire award, including interest, does not cover the cost (Drier v. Helvering, supra) ;
and on the "cash receipts" basis, the installments paid upon the award, even if the total is
sufficient, will not be apportioned between principal and interest, if the prospect of
ultimately receiving the full award is not great (Comm'r v. Speyer and Helvering v.
Drier, supra) ; the same would be true on the "accrual" basis if there is no reasonable
expectancy of payment, since such items are not accruable; but if there is such a reasonable
expectancy, of course, the principal of the award would be accrued at once and the
gain computed thereon. See Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185, 38 Sup. Ct.
467 (1918) ; G. C. M. 16166, XV-1 C. B. 175 (1938). In the normal case of interest upon
a debt or judgment, lacking the complications here considered, the payments received would
first be applied to the full interest due (income) before being applied on principal (which
may be capital or income). Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) .122,. 68 App. D. C. 211
(1938) ; see Helvering v. Drier, supra, at 503.
4Internal Revenue Code § 112 (f)
"INVbLUNTARY CONVRSIONS.-If property (as a result of its destruction in whole or
in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation,
or the threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or involuntarily converted
into property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted,
or into money which is forthwith in good faith, under regulations prescribed by the
Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, expended in the acquisition of other
property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted, or in the
acquisition of control of a corporation owning such other property, or in the establishment of a replacement fund, no gain or loss shall be recognized. If any part of the
money is not so expended, the gain, if any, shall be recognized, but in an amount not
in excess of the money which is not so expended."
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confined to the object it may be accomplished" 44-- either spend the money
(received from the public authority, insurer, or other person liable) for
other property similar or related in use, or spend it in acquiring "control"
of a corporation owning such property, or establish a replacement fund
(which requires application to the Commissioner and the giving of bond) ; a
mere replacement reserve on the books is not sufficient as a "replacement
fund", although, of course, it may be evidence of the continuing purpose to
reinvest "forthwith" in other property which is required under the first two
alternatives. 45 Although it is not essential to "earmark" the funds received,
nevertheless it has been held necessary to trace them and prove that the same
funds received were used in replacement; it is not sufficient if the money is
spent for general purposes and other money used for replacement.46 Nor is it
sufficient if the taxpayer, before receiving compensation for property conseeks to
demned, spends other money for the substituted property and later
47
reimburse himself or a lender when the compensation is received.
If the statute respecting the proceeds of involuntary conversions is complied
with, the taxpayer is not taxable upon his gain at the time, but the new property
stands in the place of the old property and takes its cost basis, with such adjustments as are necessary.48 If any part of the money received is not expended pursuant to the terms of the statute, the gain, if any, is taxable in an
amount not in excess of the money not so expended. That is, the gain upon
the transaction is computed in the usual way, by deducting the cost basis from
the proceeds, and that gain-is taxable if, or to the extent that, it does not exceed the amount not expended. 49 So far as the gain is thus taxed at the time
of the conversion, it is added to the cost basis of the new property so that it
(two years spent in search for
"August Buckhardt, 32 B. T. A. 1272, 1276 (1935)
suitable property, held not excessive) ; Estate of George Herder, 36 B. T. A. 934 (1937),
mod. on other grounds, Herder v. Helvering, 106 F. (2d) 153 (App. D. C. 1939), cert.
denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 262 (1939). But if the attempt is abandoned, the gain must be taken
in the year when it was realized and not in the year the plan was given up. Herder v.
Helvering, supra.
The regulations (Reg. 101, art. 112 (f)-l) specify that a "replacement fund" must be
applied for in any case where it is not possible "forthwith" to make the replacement. But
these cases indicate that that is unnecessary if the requisite continued diligent effort is
made.
'wRegulations 101, arts. 112 (f)-1 and 112 (f)-2; 2 PAUL AND MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (1934) §§ 17.114 et seq.; M. J.-Caldeck Corp., 36 B. T. A. 452
(1937).
"Frischkorn Development Co., 30 B. T. A. 8 (1934), aff'd w. o. op., 88 F. (2d) 1009
(C. C. A. 6th 1937); Regulations 101, art. 112 (f)-l. A more liberal attitude may be
indicated in Wilmore S. S. Co. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), holding
the Board's decision "unduly technical".
'TBandes v. Comm'r, 69 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 2d 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 568,
55 Sup. Ct. 80 (1934). It thus would be necessary to do without the property until the
money is received, if one is to take advantage of this provision. Cf. contra: Washington
Ry. & Elec. Co., 40 B. T. A. No. 185 (Dec. 22, 1939), confining the Bandes case to its
peculiar facts.
'sSee Internal Revenue Code § 113 (a) (9), and regulations thereunder.
"'See Palladium Amusement Co., 37 B. T. A. 149, 151, 155 (1938).
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will not again be taxed when that property is sold.50 If it is necessary to
expend more for the new property than was received for the old, the excess is
not a loss but is additional capital investment, to be added to the cost basis
determined as above indicated.5A special problem arises when a part of a condemnation award is used,
or is retained by the public authorities, to pay a special assessment for benefits resulting to the remainder of the property from the same project. The
regulations issued under the 1938 Act provided that amounts so retained or
expended were to be treated as part of the award received for the portion
condemned and that the expense for those benefits to the remainder was not
an "investment in property similar or related in use"; hence, that gain might
be recognized in such a case, and the expenditure for the benefits would be a
new and distinct investment adding to the cost basis of the property benefited.52 But the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, followed finally
by the Board of Tax Appeals, disapproved this regulation, not by differently
construing "property similar or related in use", but by declaring that, to the
extent of the special assessment, no gain was realized because it was instantly
absorbed in a new cost which arose and was paid without even momentary
possession of the "gain". 53 The details of this new rule are only now being
worked out by the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board has held that the
special assessment no longer may be added to the cost basis of the remaining
property (except to the extent that it exceeds the compensation awarded so
that the taxpayer is actually out of pocket), for, under this theory of offsetting the award and the assessment, there was no cost incurred for the
benefits.54 It has also been held that the assessment need not be simultaneous
with the making of the award, although no case has passed upon what the
result would be if the award were not only made but paid before any assessment was levied. 55 At least it is not necessary even that the assessment be
'Internal Revenue Code § 113 (a) (9).
'Regulations 101, arts. 112 (f)-1 and 113 (a) (9)-1.
'Regulations 101, art. 112 (f)-l.
"Carrano v. Comm'r, 70 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; Wolf v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d)
455 (C. C. A. 9th 1935) ; Christian Ganahl Co. v. Comm'r, 91 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 9th
1937), cert. denied, 302 J. S. 748, 58 Sup. Ct. 265 (1937) ; Central & Pacific Imp. Corp.
v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) ; Calvin C. Green, 37 B. T. A. 25 (1938) ;
Jamieson Associates, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 92, 115 (1938), iod. on other grounds, sub nom.
Seaside Improvement Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 41; Palladium Amusement Co., 37
B. T. A. 149 (1938) ; Income Syndicate, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 926 (1938) ; Langley Collyer,
38 B. T. A. 106 (1938).
The Commissioner acquiesced in these rulings and modified the regulation accordingly.
T. D. 4951, (1939) Int. Rev. Bull. No. 42, p. 2, 7 U. S. LAw WEzX 375 (Oct. 17, 1939).
'Palladium Amusement Co., 37 B. T. A. 149 (1938), giving formula for computations.

'Central & Pacific Imp. Corp. v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) ; Jamieson

Associates, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 92, 115 (1938), rood. on other grounds, sub norn. Seaside
Improvement Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 41. In these cases, payment of the award was
held up until the assessment was made. If, for any reason, the reward were received free
and clear before the assessment was made, the cases concerning income received under
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paid from the award money or at the same time, if in fact a liability has
attached to the taxpayer's property through the issuance of improvement
bonds.56 Special assessments levied on account of other projects than the
one for which a portion of the property was condemned, even though' retained by the public authorities when paying the award, may not be treated as
reducing the net award under this rule, which is limited to assessments
57
arising out of the same transaction.
It was formerly held that so much of a condemnation award as could be
allocated to "severance damages"-i.e., injury to the remaining land rather
than value of the portion condemned-would not be considered as proceeds
of the portion condemned but would be applied to reduce the cost basis of the
balance. 58 But after the adoption of the new rule respecting special assessments, the Board held that the entire award received, less the special assessment, should be considered in determining the net award upon which to
compute the gain realized. 59 However, it is probable that, in cases where
there is no special assessment, or where the severance damages exceed the
assessment, the older practice will still be applicable, for the real basis of the
last mentioned case seems to be that, because of the benefits (for which the
assessment was made), there was no net damage to the remaining land and
the benefit assessment should be set off first against the severance damages
before it is used to reduce the proceeds of the land taken; therefore, it would
seem that severance damages awarded, in excess of benefit assessments, would
still be applied to reduce the cost basis of the remaining land rather than be
treated as proceeds of the land taken. 0
In some cases, the entire amount of a judgment representing compensation
for property seized, stolen, destroyed, or injured may be taxable as income.
For the loss may have been deducted by the taxpayer at the time it was sustained.6 The mere existence of a cause of action for the injury does not
claim of right without restriction on its disposition might apply. (Infra, p. 249, and
Part Two).
'Income Syndicate, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 926 (1938).
'Langley Collyer, 38 B .T. A. 106 (1938).
'I. T. 2599, X-2 C. B. 170 (1931) ; G. C. M. 12657, XIII-1 C. B. 80 (1934). It was
held, in the latter ruling, that the taxpayer must prove, either from the terms of the
award or from evidence of the reduction in value attributable to the condemnation, how
much of the award was allocable to severance damages. If he failed to do so, it was all
treated as compensation for the portion taken.
'Calvin C. Green, 37 B. T. A. 25 (1938). The same principle apparently was applied
in Christian Ganahl Co. v. Comm'r, 91 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 302
U. S. 748, 58 Sup. Ct. 265 (1937), for it appears from the report in 34 B. T. A. 126 (1936)
that the award, which the circuit court treated as a unit, included an element of
severance damages.
'It is significant that in Langley Collyer, 38 B. T. A. 106 (1938), the Board did not
refuse to treat severance damages as distinct from the proceeds of the property taken, but
went off rather upon a failure of proof.
'Section 23 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code permits deduction of losses sustained by
corporations, if not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. Section 23 (e) permits
deduction of losses sustained by individpals if incurred in trade or business, or if incurred
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prevent such deduction. 62 Hence, it may often happen that one who has
properly deducted a loss may later recoup his loss in court, and in such a case
he must report the entire sum as income, for, in an income tax sense, he has
already had the benefit of recovering his cost when he took the deduction, and
the entire amount is gain.63
Although perhaps not strictly within the
in any other transaction entered into for profit; or losses of non-business property if they
arise from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft, if not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise.
'The injury is a closed transaction causing a loss, and the contingency that some other
person, who does not now admit liability, may later be held liable does not amount to
"compensation". United States v. S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U. S.398, 47 Sup.
Ct. 598 (1927) (loss by seizure deducted, later compensated, but deduction held proper) ;
Earle v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) (loss from theft deductible without
showing there was no chance of recovery) ; Comm'r v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F. (2d)
913 (C. C. A. 7th 1934)-, cert. denied, 293 U. S.626, 294 U. S.731, 55 Sup. Ct. 346, 505
(1935) (fire loss deductible when suffered, not when taxpayer loses action against
person allegedly at fault) ; Comm'r v. John Thatcher & Son, 76 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A.
2d 1935) (contractor did work after subcontractors defaulted; expense must be taken
then and not when he loses suit against sureties) ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Conm'r, 82
F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 4th 1936) (guaranty contract is not "compensation" if liability
is disputed) ; Hinrichs v. Helvering, 95 F. (2d) 117, 68 App. D. C. 206 (1938) (worthless
stock deductible although there exists a cause of action against fraudulent seller).
But cf. Douglas County Light & Water Co. v. Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 9th
1930), and American Propeller & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 168, 185, 83 Ct.
Cl. 100, 133 (1936), mod. on other grounds, 17 F. Supp. 215 (Ct. Cl. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 300 U. S.475, 57 Sup. Ct. 521 (1937), which are distinguishable but seem inconsistent in principle.
A special rule seems to have been developed by the Board of Tax Appeals with
respect to compensation by insurance where the insurer denies liability. Even though the
insurer not only disputes the amount of the loss (Max Kurtz, 8 B. T. A. 679 (19271) but
denies all liability, so that it becomes necessary to sue to collect-a fact which would prevent a claim from being accrued as income (see infra, p. 244), yet it is held that the loss
is "compensated" and may not be deducted until loss of the lawsuit or other disposition of
the claim fixes the loss. Allied Furriers Corp., 24 B. T. A. 457 (1931). The case seemed
much weakened by a reversal of the Board in Cahn v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A.
9th 1937), holding a loss not compensated when not only was liability disputed but the
insurer would have to be sued in England with little chance of success. But the Board, in
Rose Licht, 37 B. T. A. 1096 (1938), confined that case to its facts, and followed the old
rule regarding mere disputed liability; however, the case is distinguishable because the
dispute did not arise until a subsequent year, so that the loss was "compensated" in the
taxable year. Cf. Broderick v. Anderson, 23 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. N. Y. 1938) (loss in one
year, 90 days allowed to report loss, which carried it over to next year; held, no loss sustained until 90 days expired without a report of the loss).
OCooper v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 216, 224 (C. C. A. 8th 1925) ; Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; Marine Transport Co. v. Comm'r, 77
F. (2d) 177 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; Flynn v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ;
W. W. Cleveland, 28 B. T. A. 578 (1933), aff'd w. o. op., 77 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 5th
1935) ; South Dakota Concrete Products Co., 26 B. T. A. 1429 (1932); Griffiths v.
Helvering, 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939).
Even though recoupment of the loss occurs before tax liability for the year of the loss
has been finally determined, it is to be reported as income when recovered rather than
applied as a correction of the former year's return. United States v. S. S. White Dental
Co., 274 U. S.398, 47 Sup. Ct. 598 (1927) ; Cahn v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A.
9th 1937). A different rule applies to tax refunds, 'infra pp. 231-233.
The basis for the rule is thus stated in Estate of William H. Block, 39 B. T. A. 338, 341
(1939) :
"Income tax liability must be determined for annual periods on the basis of facts
as they existed in each period. When recovery or some other event which is inconsistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment must be made in
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definition of income, "the duty to make a return of recoupments was implicit in
the original right to take the deductions". 64
Nevetheless, if the taxpayer might have deducted the loss when it occurred
but failed to do so, 65 he is not taxable upon the recoupment; for the recovery
is not taxed qua income but solely in order to cancel deductions of which the
taxpayer has had the benefit, when subsequent events occur inconsistent with
the facts upon which the deduction was based."'
Similar principles apply with respect to bad debts. If once charged off as
worthless, whether properly or improperly, the recovery is all income.6T But
if not charged off (or if the taxpayer got no benefit from the charge-off
because he had a net loss), the collection of the formerly worthless debt does
not result in taxable income. 68
An entirely distinct line of decisions has grown up with respect to recoveries
of taxes erroneously paid. Numerous cases have held that money erroneously
paid to a government (federal or state, at least) is not a loss, even if no legal
remedy for its recovery is available, and therefore the principle just discussed
is inapplicable; instead of deducting the tax in the year it accrues or is paid
and reporting the refund as income when recovered, the "mistake" (whether
reporting income in the year in which the change occurs. No other system would be
practical in view of the statute of limitations, the obvious administrative difficulties
involved, and the lack of finality in income tax liability, which would result." (Italics
supplied.)
'Comm'r v. Van Schaick, 83 F. (2d) 940, 941 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) [dictum; the actual
holding of the case, refraining from applying this rule to insurance companies, was
rendered obsolete by the 1932 Act, broadening the definition of their income. Internal
Revenue Code § 204 (b) (1)].
"Either through neglect or because he had no net income against which to offset the loss.
'The first square holding to this effect was in Central Loan & Investment Co., 39
B. T. A. 981 (1939) (tax refund), followed in Edward H. Clark, 40 B. T. A. 333 (1939).
But as early as the case of Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B. T. A. 1339 (1933), the Board had
concurred in the Commissioner's concession of this principle. In Drier v. Helvering, 72
F. (2d) 76, 77, 63 App. D. C. 283 (1934), the Commissioner conceded the point, and
the court declared it would "be slow to say" that the full recovery would be taxable
when there had been no deduction. A similar result is indicated in G. C. M. 18525, 1937-1
C. B. 80, and G. C. M. 20854, 1939-1 C. B. 102, 6 U. S. LAw WEEK 924 (Mar. 7, 1939),
concerning bad debts later recovered. But cf. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S.
359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931), relating to expenses for which the benefit of a deduction had
not been enjoyed because of net losses, the Court holding nevertheless that a recovery
therefor was taxable.
Of course, these cases by no means establish that one failing to take a deduction at the
proper time may later take a deduction when he fails in his action to recoup the loss. See
Comm'r v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 7th 1934), cert. denied, 293
U. S. 626, 294 U. S.731, 55 Sup. Ct. 346, 505 (1935) ; Comm'r v. John Thatcher & Son,
76 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d 1935). Cf. contra: Douglas County Light & Water Co. v.
Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 9th 1930). They merely refrain from penalizing him
with a tax upon the recoupment of a loss which he did not deduct.
Putnam Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 50 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 5th 1931) ; Askin & Marine
Co. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) (improperly charged off, debt never
worthless; taxpayer estopped to rely upon that fact to argue that later collection is not
income). Regulations 101, art. 23 (k)-l (b).
'National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 40 B. T. A. 72 (1939) ; G. C. M. 18525, 1937-1
C. B. 80 (confined to supervised banks) ; G. C. M. 20854, 1939-1 C. B. 102, 6 U. S. LAW
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of fact, statutory construction, or constitutionality, and no matter how
vigorously it is contested) is treated as if it had never occurred, and the income
tax of the year the tax was deducted is adjusted to reflect the ultimate result. 69
But the statute of limitations upon the assessment of a deficiency for the
earlier year, when the deduction then taken is later found to require correction,
necessitates a modification of this rule, and later cases have held it applicable
only when the tax liability for the year of the deduction has not been finally
determined. 70 If it is no longer possible to correct the tax for the prior year,
the recovery is treated like any other recoupment of a loss or expense previously deducted, and is taxable income when recovered. 71 For the deduction
924 (Mar. 7, 1939) (extending it to all bad debts). The latter memorandum describes the method of determining whether the taxpayer has had the benefit of the
deduction, as follows: First take all other deductions than bad debts, and determine
whether there was a net income. To the extent that there was, the bad debt deduction
resulted in a benefit. All the bad debts of one year are treated as a unit, and the entire
amount of any recovery for such debts is treated as a return of capital until enough is
recovered to equal the amount of which he did not have the benefit. Thus, if the gross
income less all other deductions is $4000, and bad debts are $10,000, he has had the benefit
of a $4000 deduction for them, and the first $6000 recovered upon those debts is not
taxable. Presumably a similar formula would apply with respect to other losses which
are not deducted and are later recouped.
Cf. contra: E. C. Miner Lithographing Co., 1 B. T. A. 588 (1925), holding taxable in
full a recovery upon a debt that had been worthless before there was an income tax 'law,
for which, of course, the taxpayer had made no deduction.
Where the taxpayer is assigned a number of claims, some of which have been charged
off by the assignor, who, however, received no benefit from the charge-off because of net
losses, the rule above stated is not applied. In that case, the cost of the claims to the
taxpayer is the important factor, and if none of the consideration given is allocable to
those claims, the later recovery is taxable in full. The fact that the assignor got no
benefit from the charge-off is of no concern to the assignee. National Bank of Commerce
of Seattle, supra.
'Inland Products Co. v. Blair, 31 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 4th 1929) (error of law, federal
tax, voluntarily refunded although taxpayer had no remedy available to recover it);
Leach v. Comm'r, 50 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 1st 1931) (erroneous assessment, federal tax) ; Bergan v. Comm'r, 80 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) (same) ; Bohemian
Breweries v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 588, 89 Ct. Cl. - (1939) (same as Inland Products
case) ; Philip C. Brown, 10 B. T. A. 1122 (1928) (unconstitutional state tax) ; Lehigh
Valley Coal Sales Co., 15 B. T. A. 1401, 1405 (1929) (same) ; Joseph V. Horn, 23 B. T. A.
1131 (1931) (subsequent retroactive change of law; seemingly bad on principle, for
this is a clear case of the effect of subsequent events upon a Proper deduction rather than
a mistaken deduction; cf. contra: Central United Nat'l Bank, 33 B. T. A. 588 (1935),
aff'd, 99 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th 1938); and see Estate of William H. Block, 39
WEEK

B. T. A. 338 (1939)].

This rule has not been applied to ordinary losses, even when recoupment occurs while it
would still be possible to adjust the return for the year of the loss. Supra note 63.
'By the passing of the statute of limitations without the commencement of proceedings,
or by a closing agreement.
'Houbigant, Inc., 31 B. T. A. 954 (1934), aff'd w. o. op., 80 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d
1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 669, 56 Sup. Ct. 834 (1936) (customs duties, erroneous
classification) ; Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935), aff'd w. o. op., 83 F.
(2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) (local real estate tax, valuation disputed) ; Charles W.
Nash, 34 B. T. A. 675 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th 1937), cert. denied,
301 U. S. 700, 57 Sup. Ct. 930 (1937) (unconstitutional state tax) ; Chevy Chase Land
Co., 34 B. T. A. 150 (1936) (unconstitutional local tax) ; Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T. A.
471 (1938) (erroneous statutory construction) ; Estate of William H. Block, 39 B. T. A.
338 (1939) (tax reduced by retroactive law).
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was proper72 (although subject to correction in the light of later events), and
it is not violative of the statute of limitations for the Commissioner to adjust
the tax in the year of recovery when it is no longer permissible to make the
adjustment in the year in which it would more truly reflect net income. Here
also, of course, if the benefit of a deduction was not enjoyed, the refund is
not income. 73
There are a number of actions involving property the effect of which has
yet to be considered. The heir who contests a will successfully in the courts,
of course, takes the proceeds of the action by inheritance and is not taxable
upon them as income. 74 And it is now settled that amounts paid to an heir
75
to forestall a contest of the will by him are likewise not income.
What little authority there is, in contests over the title to property (other
than will contests), holds that when a settlement results in conveyance of the
property to the taxpayer, or in a payment of money to him, the money or the
value of the land is taxable except to the extent that his claimed interest therein
78
bad a cost to him.
A suit to set aside a transfer of property in fraud of creditors, of course,
-E. L. Bruce Co., 19 B. T. A. 777 (1930) ; Guitar Trust Estate 34 B. T. A. 857, 873
(1936). Those cases hold that, where an illegal tax is paid and no refund is had, the
payment is deductible as a business expense or a loss. This is no help when a void nonbusiness tax is paid, so it was held in Charles F. Fawcett, 30 B. T. A. 908 (1934), that
it was deductible as a tax, distinguishing the Bruce case, somewhat obscurely, upon the
ground that there the payment resulted from a settlement of litigation, whereas in the
Fawcett case it was voluntarily paid as a tax and the tax statute itself (by its statute of
limitations) prevented a refund after the invalidation of the tax. Quaere, what the result
would be if the facts of the Bruce case (litigation) arose in connection with a non-business
tax, which could be held deductible only as a tax, not as a business expense or business loss.
"Edward S. Harkness, 31 B. T. A. 1100 (1935) ; Central Loan & Investment Co., 39
B. T. A. 981 (1939).
"Internal Revenue Code § 22 (b) (3). See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 196, 59
Sup. Ct. 155 (1938).
"Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155 (1938) ; Magruder v. Segebade, 94 F.
(2d) 177 (C. C. A. 4th 1938) ; Thornton Emmons, 39 B. T. A. 75 (1939). Cf. Benfield
v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 56, 88 Ct. Cl. 486 (1939) (similar treatment of voluntary
adjustment, no contest having been made). See note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1267. This
note and the Lyeth case discuss the state court decisions, a majority of which had treated
a compromise payment as not being an inheritance, for inheritancetax purposes.
""In Sterling v. Comm'r, 93 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 663,
58 Sup. Ct. 829 (1938), a payment to the taxpayer by a devisee's widow, to clear title to
land without the necessity of a suit to construe the will, was held income in toto, the tax
court itself construing the will and finding the taxpayer's claim under the will valueless.
Similar reasoning was applied in Lyeth v. Hoey, 96 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), and
the Sterling case may be considered to have fallen with the reversal of the Lyeth case.
However, where the claimant (taxpayer) rests his claim not upon his position as heir
but upon some other basis, those principles may apply. See S. A. Pierce, 8 B. T. A.
1218 (1927), in which the taxpayer made a gift of property and later sued to get it back
on the theory of constructive trust, which suit was settled; if a constructive trust were
proved, of course, the property remained his throughout; but if a gift was consummated
and the later settlement was merely consideration paid to avoid a lawsuit, it would be
income; the mere agreement of the parties did not establish the existence of a constructive
trust, and no evidence thereof was presented to the Board, so the whole was held to be
income.
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cannot be considered apart from the claim of the creditor against the transferor.
Hence, any property so recovered, or a cash settlement of such an action, will
7
be income or not, depending upon the nature of the plaintiff's basic claim.?
'There is a class of compensatory recoveries no part of which is taxed as
income, since no cost basis can be assigned to the injury which is sustained.
Most important of these are recoveries on account of personal injuries. This
is now expressly provided for by statute, 78 but the same rule had previously
been followed.79 In the same category, although not covered by the statutory
exception, are recoveries for libel and slander,8 0 for alienation of affections,8 '
or for breach of promise to marry,82 and sums received in settlement of a child
custody suit.8 3 For the human body and the reputation which are injured
are in no true sense capital or property upon which a value can be placed for
the purpose of computing the profit realized; the promise to marry likewise is
a personal right not susceptible of appraisal in relation to market values; and
the spouse whose affections are alienated and the child whose custody is surrendered are not chattels which are sold.
Also in this category are alimony payments, and the like. In this field,
there has been much recent development, and the details of the law are far from
settled.84 But the basic principle is clear. Alimony and separation allowances,
and payments for the support of children and for the release of dower, are not
taxable as income of the wife. 5 Such payments do not arise from contract
Oil & Gas Co., 40 B. T. A. 797 (1939).
"Internal Revenue Code § 22 (b) (5). The statute seems broad enough to cover
even periodical payments in the nature of a replacement of earnings. It covers amounts
received whether by suit or by agreement. See I. T. 3306, (1939) Int. Rev. Bull. No. 32,
p. 2, 7 U. S. LAw WEEK 163 (Aug. 22, 1939).
Interest upon a personal injury judgment is taxable, since it is compensation not for
the injury but for the delay in paying a debt. Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B. T. A. 1339
(1933).
"31 Op. Atty. Gen. 304 (U. S. 1918) ; T. D. 2747 (Int. Rev., 1918).
'Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C. B. 92 (1922) (covering personal libel; reserved question of libel
affecting bushess reputation or property rights) ; C. A. Hawkins, 6 B. T. A. 1023 (1927)
(involved business reputation). The Hawkins case expressly reserved the question of the
taxability of special damages representing lost income rather than mere injury to reputation. It also reserved the question of exemplary damages, but since those are in the
nature of a penalty, a gratuitous transfer designed to discourage improper acts, and not
a gain derived from labor or capital, it may be that they are non-taxable. Cf. Central R. R.
of N. J. v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 3d 1935), mpra note 32.
'Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C. B. 92 (1922).
eI. T. 1804, 11-2 C. B. 61 (1923) ; Mrs. Lyde McDonald, 9 B. T. A. 1340 (1928) (Board
emphasized instructions of judge, which had stressed compensatory rather than exemplary
damages; but see supra note 80).
'Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C. B. 92 (1922).
'As will be discussed presently, the Supreme Court laid down a new principle
respecting alimony trusts in1935, the circuit courts of appeals differed on its application,
and the Board followed the Second Circuit-which in 1939 overruled its former decision,
leaving a big question mark on the intervening cases in the B. T. A. The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari (on one of the other cases involving the point).
See a full discussion in Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willcutts (Nov. 1939) 53
HARv. L. REv. 1.
'Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 Sul. Ct. 53 (1917) : Tane B. Coates, 3 B. T. A.
429 (1926) ; Regulations 101, art. 22 (b) (3)-1. If a note is given for the alimony or
'Swastika
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but from the marriage relationship, and represent the portion of the husband's
estate or income to the enjoyment of which the wife is equitably entitled.
The case of Douglas v. Willcutts8 and its numerous progeny have extended
87
this rule to the income of trusts set up to discharge those obligations.
Although the great bulk of the cases here discussed concern the question
whether the trust income is taxable to the husband, they rest upon the
principle that the income is used to discharge the legal obligation of the husband
to the wife, and it follows that in the situations where it is held to be income
taxable to the husband, it is not taxable to the wife.8 8 The same rules apply
whether the settlement or decree pursuant to which the trust is created purports
to discharge the husband's obligation of support or the wife's marital rights in
his property.8 9 If in fact the trust income discharges such obligation; it is
immaterial whether the divorce court adopted or otherwise referred to the trust
settlement in its decree. 90
It is, of course, most clear that when a: fixed sum is regularly payable to the
wife, the husband guaranteeing against any deficiency in the trust income, the
trust income is really used for his benefit, to discharge a fixed and continuing
obligation, and the trust is merely security therefor.9 Likewise, if the divorce
other obligation, the interest upon it partakes of the same character as the principal payment. Cf. Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 116, 64 App. D. C. 238 (1935) (holding
husband may not deduct it as interest upon indebtedness; the reasoning of the opinion
would apply to the converse situation, rendering it not taxable to the wife).
'296 U. S.1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935).
'Identical principles apply to the assignment of an interest in an existing trust or the
income thereof. Donnelly v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 7th 1939), cert. denied,
59 Sup. Ct. 1043 (1939).
The assignment of one's future income is considered in Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S.
5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937). If the income depends upon the continued activity of the
transferor, it continues taxable to him even though it does not pass through his hands;
but if a recognized interest in existing property, which is transferable by local law, is
transferred (even though in the form of an assignment of future income), the income
thereafter is that of the transferee alone, unless the income (not the property) discharges
a continuing obligation of the transferor. See also Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F. (2d) 13
(C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; Clifford v. Helvering, 105 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert.
granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 139 (1939) ; George 0. Knapp, 40 B. T. A. No. 174 (Dec. 19, 1939).
'The Board so held in Mary R. Spencer, 20 B. T. A. 58 (1930), and Maud H. Bush,
33 B. T. A. 628 (1935), both of which anticipated the Douglas case. Those cases. were
followed in Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis, 37 B. T. A. 41 (1938). See also G. C. M.
13308, XIII-2 C. B. 184, 186 (1934). But the variants here discussed were all worked out
with respect to the husband, and apply to the converse situation only by analogy.
'Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935) (in lieu of both alimony and
dower) ; Helvering v. Coxey, 297 U. S. 694, 56 Sup. Ct. 498 (1936), rev'g w. o. op. 79
F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 3d 1935); Helvering v. Brooks, 82 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d
1936) (overruled on other grounds in Helvering v. Leonard, 105 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d
1939)); John Ernest Goldring, 36 B. T. A. 779 (1937); E. T. Weir, 39 B. T. A. 400
(1939) ; Robert Barbour, 39 B. T. A. 910 (1939).
'Helvering v. Coxey, 297 U. S. 694, 56 Sup. Ct. 498 (1936), rev'g w. o. op. 79 F. (2d)
661 (C. C. A. 3d 1935) ; Comm'r v. Hyde, 82 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; Alsop v.
Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 767, 303 U. S. 666,
58 Sup. Ct. 480, 521 (1938) ; Albert C. Whitaker, 33 B. T. A. 865 (1935), appeal dismissed, 87 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 4th 1937) ; E. T. Weir, 39 B. T. A. 400 (1939) ; Rowe
B. Metcalf, 40 B. T. A. 177 (1939).
'The guaranty of a fixed income was present in Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1, 56
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court has a continuing power to modify the decree, irrespective of any agreement of the parties, the duty of support thus continues irrespective of the
settlement or decree, and the trust income serves to satisfy the continuing
obligation of the husband.9 2 But if the setting up of the trust absolutely and
forever discharges the husband of all further obligation to his wife-if he
neither guarantees the income from the property nor may be ordered by the
divorce court to supplement it-it is exactly as if he had given her outright
a lump sum of money or property, the income from which would dearly be the
wife's, not the husband's; the circumstance that it is placed in trust does not
change it. The obligation was "paid off" once and for all by the transfer of
property,and there is no continuing obligation which is met by the income. In
such a case, three circuit courts of appeals have held that the husband is
relieved and the wife pays the tax just as upon any other income from her
property.9 3
Of course, if there exists no obligation to the wife, or if no obligation is
released as a result of setting up the trust, there is an outright gift of an
Sup. Ct. 59 (1935) ; Comm'r v. Hyde, 82 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; Alsop v.
Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 767, 303 U. S. 666,
58 Sup. Ct. 480, 521 (1938); Robert Glendinning, 36 B. T. A. 486 (1937), aff'd, 97 F.
(2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d 1938); Donnelly v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 7th 1939),
cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 1043 (1939) ; Frank P. Welch, 12 B. T. A. 800 (1928) ; Frank
Turner, 28 B. T. A. 91 (1933), aff'd w. o. op., 71 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ;

Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis, 37 B. T. A. 41 (1938) ; Cap Andrew Tilles, 38 B. T. A.

545, 548 (1938); E. T. Weir, 39 B. T. A. 400 (1939); Robert Barbour, 39 B. T. A.
910 (1939). See also XIII-2 C. B. 184, 186 (1934).

'This fact was brought out in Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935).
It was also true in Helvering v. Coxey, 297 U. S. 694, 56 Sup. Ct. 498 (1936) (no
opinion), and in Helvering v. Brooks, 82 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d 1936), but was not
mentioned by the courts; it is pointed out in Fitch v. Comm'r, 103 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A.
8th 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 103 (1939), and Helvering v. Leonard, 105 F. (2d)

9000 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).

Comm'r v. Tuttle, 89 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) ; Fitch v. Comm'r, 103 F.

(2d) 702 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 103 (1939) ; Helvering v.
Leonard, 105 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). The Second Circuit's holding had been

contrary in principle (although the case was actually distinguishable by a fact dehors
the opinion), in Helvering v. Brooks, 82 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d 1936), which the Board
had consistently followed, distinguishing or waving aside the Tuttle case; when the Board
was finally forced to choose between the flatly contradictory Brooks and Fitch cases, it
chose the Brooks case [in Rowe B. Metcalf, 40 B. T. A. 177 (1939)], on the very day
when that case was repudiated by the Second Circuit in the Leonard case. The Board
had followed the Tuttle case, however, in cases clearly involving a division of property
rather than alimony. Ernestine Mitchell, 38 B. T. A. 1336 (1938) ; Howard S. Dudley,
39 B. T. A. 1170 (1939).
Here also, the rule is the same whether the obligation discharged is for support
(Helvering v. Leonard, supra) or for property rights (Tuttle v. Comm'r and Fitch v.
Comm'r, supra).
If the minimum amount of the income is not guaranteed by the husband, it is immaterial
that he is entitled to all that above a fixed amount, for he has no continuing obligation.
Fitch v. Comm'r, supra.
The Treasury has not acquiesced in the cases, and the whole question is now pending
before the Supreme Court. [The Fitch case was reversed by the Supreme Court, 8 U. S.
L. Week 189 (Jan. 29, 1940), for failure to establish that the Iowa court had no power to
modify the decree, without disapproving the principle stated.-ED.]
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interest in the trust property and the income is taxable to the wife in any
event.9" But if there is an existing obligation for which the trust income
(guaranteed as to amount) is intended as a substitute, the subsequent termination of the underlying obligation does not relieve the husband or shift the
tax to the wife, for the release of the existing obligation was a valuable consideration for the substitution of a new obligation lasting for the duration of
the trust, which the guaranteed income ever after discharges. 95
If the other conditions are met rendering the trust income taxable to the wife
rather than to the husband, the result is not changed by the fact that the
husband retains a large power to direct the investments and to vote the stocks
in the trust,96 or even that he himself is the trustee,9 7 for his interest in the
trust is not such control of the econonic benefits as is subject to tax; the
income is beyond his control and (by hypothesis) serves no purpose beneficial
to him.
It should be borne in mind that the foregoing rules apply only to irrevocable
trusts. If the husband or a person not having a substantial adverse interest,
or the husband together with such a person, has a power to revest the property
in the husband, the income is taxable to him (and not to the wife) regardless
of the other circumstances just discussed.98 While a power of revocation
would be rare in alimony trusts, it might frequently happen that the trust
would be limited to the life of the wife, or until her remarriage, or for a term
of years. The regulations specify that if, in such a case, there is a reversion
in the grantor (the husband), the income may, in certain circumstances, be
taxable to him.9 9 But several circuit courts of appeals have held that the term
0
'Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; Henry Oliver Rea, 35 B. T. A.
1132 (1937) (trust set up pending divorce, but alimony could not be had in that state,
and no evidence that any other obligation was released) ; Edward T. Hall, 36 B. T. A. 398
(1937) (wife had sacrificed rights to alimony and dower because of adultery; trust
voluntarily set up).
'Alsop v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 767, 303
U. S. 666, 58 Sup. Ct. 480, 521 (1938) (remarriage of wife, would have relieved of
alimony, but trust continued with guaranteed income; husband had liquidated his alimony
obligation which might have ended upon remarriage, discharging it by fixed payments
over wife's whole life, so it is taxable to him) ; Robert Glendinning, 36 B. T. A. 486
(1937), aff'd, 97 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d 1938) (state law gave no alimony, but trust
income, guaranteed for life, was substituted for existing temporary support order);
Clayton G. Dixon, 39 B. T. A. 795 (1939) (trust for life in discharge of existing obligation to support wife, unaffected by subsequent divorce which ends obligation of support
in that state). But cf. Harry S. Blumenthal, 34 -B. T. A. 994 (1936), aff'd w. o. op., 91
F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) (remarriage, trust continued though alimony obligation
would have ceased, held no longer taxable to husband; distinguishable in that there was
no guaranty of income and the court's power over the decree ceased at remarriage).
'Comm'r v. Tuttle, 89 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) (voting rights) ; Clifford v.
Helvering, 105 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 139 (1939)
(voting and investment) ; Claude R. Branch, 40 B. T. A. No. 160 (Dec. 7, 1939).
'Clifford v. Helvering, 105 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct.
139 (1939) ; Claude R. Branch, 40 B. T. A. No. 160 (Dec. 7, 1939).
"SInternal Revenue Code § 166; Regulations 101, art. 166-1.
"Regulations 101, art. 166-1. But cf. I. T. 3238, 1938-2 C. B. 204.
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"power to revest" contemplates a power to put an end to the estate granted,
and that a reversion following an absolute trust terminating after a period of
years or upon an event beyond the grantor's control is not such; hence that
the rules already stated would apply to such trusts, unaffected by this
provision of law.' °°
If a trust for alimony or in lieu of dower is of such a nature that its income
it nevertheless becomes taxable to the wife
would be taxable to the husband,
0
after the husband's death.' '
This concludes the consideration of the taxability of judgments and settlements in the various kinds of actions. There remain a few general remarks
relative to recoveries of all kinds.
The interest upon a judgment, like interest upon any debt, is taxable income,
02
even though the judgment itself be non-taxable.
The fact that a judgment, which is otherwise taxable, is obtained against a
state or a subdivision thereof does not make the judgment or the interest
03
thereon exempt from federal income tax.
u'-United States v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, 74 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 5th 1934)
(prior to regulations; treated trust for years as equivalent to estate for years in property) ;
Comm'r v. Tuttle, 89 F. (2d) 112, 115 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) (same); Comm'r v. Wood,
104 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 139 (1939) (no opinion) ;
Clifford v. Helvering, 105 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 8th 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct139 (1939) (repudiates regulations as in direct conflict with plain language of statute,
and hence not validated by re-enactment of statute) ; Claude R. Branch, 40 B. T. A. No.
160 (Dec. 7, 1939).

"'Thomas v. Comm'r, 100 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d 1938). The court is not entirely
clear in its reasons, but apparently it rests upon the highly practical consideration that
it would be impossible to collect from anyone but the wife, since the husband's estate
might be closed long before the wife died, and it would be impracticable to keep the estate
open, subject to an indeterminate demand for annual income taxes throughout the life of
the wife. Judge Learned Hand, concurring, remarked that this might be a hardship on the
wives at first but that in the future women accepting settlements could take account of
this
possibility of future taxability when making their demands. Attorneys take heed r
1
Monell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) (interest on non-taxable tax
refund) ; Henri Chouteau, 22 B. T. A. 850 (1931) ; Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B. T. A.
1339 (1933) (interest on personal injury judgment); G. C. M. 9210, X-1 C. B. 129
(1931). A different rule may apply to the interest upon an alimony claim. Cf. Longyear
v. Helvering, supra note 85.
But if the combined principal and interest included in an award for property taken
(rather than subsequently accruing upon the judgment) is less than the loss compensated
for thereby (if not previously deducted), the designation of part of the award as interest
is not controlling, and enough of the award to cover the loss is non-taxable. Drier v.
Helvering, 72 F. (2d) 76, 63 App. D. C. 283 (1934).
The interest included in a condemnati6n award has been held to be a part of the award'
for the property, and hence taxable as capital gain. Seaside Improvement Co. v. Comm'r,
105 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 263 (1939) ; Estate of Edgar
S. Appleby, 41 B. T. A. No. 4 (1940).
'To tax the judgment (or condemnation award, to the extent that gain is realized)
imposes no burden upon the state or its subdivision, so there is no constitutional objection.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) ; cf. Fullilove v.
United States, 71 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 5th 1934).
The same is true of the interest upon such a judgment. And the statutory exemption

of interest upon the obligations of states and their subdivisions [Internal Revenue Code
§ 22 (b) (4)] has been held to be confined to obligations created under the borrowing,
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If the plaintiff is a non-resident alien or a foreign corporation (whether or
not doing business within the United States), special problems arise by virtue
of the peculiar structure of the statutory provisions defining their income from
sources within the United States. The construction of those statutes, with
respect to unusual kinds of income, is still highly unsettled. 1°4
power, and not to extend to interest on judgments. United States Trust Co. v. Anderson,
65 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, supra.
'Non-resident aliens and all foreign corporations are taxable only upon their income
from sources within the United States. Internal Revenue Code §§ 211 and 231. Section
119 (a) specifies that "the following items of gross income shall be treated as income
from sources within the United States", and lists interest, dividends, compensation for
personal services, rentals and royalties, and gains from sales of real property, with
special provisions respecting each. The Board of Tax Appeals has repeatedly held that
this is an exclusive list, and that a judgment not fitting into one ' of these categories is
not taxable to a non-resident alien or foreign corporation plaintiff. Consorzio Veneziano
di Armamento e Navigazione, 21 B. T. A. 984 (1930) (interest on judgment against
United States; held not "interest on interest-bearing obligation of a resident". both of
which elements were held to be requisite to come within the language of § 119) ; Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 25 B. T. A. 1328 (1932) (same) ; N. 'V. Koninklijke Hollandische
Lloyd, 34 B. T. A. 830 (1936) (judgment covering lost profits resulting from tort);
Suffolk Co., Ltd., 37 B. T. A. 1156 (1938) (refund of tax previously deducted). The
Stockhohns Enskilda case was affirmed, sub nor. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank,
68 F. (2d) 407 (App. D. C. 1933), but was then reversed, 293 U. S.84, 55 Sup. Ct. 50
(1934), solely upon the interpretation of the words "resident" and "interest-bearing
obligation", nothing in the opinion suggesting that the list in § 119 (a) was not exclusive.
The same is true of Helvering v. British-American Tobacco, Ltd., 69 F. (2d) 528
(C. C. A. 2d 1934), aff'd, 293 U. S. 95, 55 Sup. Ct. 55 (1934). Before the Supreme
Court had spoken favorably to the Government, the Congress plugged the loophole by
adding, in the 1934 Act, "interest from the United States", etc. The committee reports
declared that the law had been incorrectly interpreted but that it was desired to remove
all doubts. (1934) H. R. RFEP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 32; (1934) SEN. REP.
No. 558, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 38. But this likewise suggests that only the interpretation of "residents" and "obligations" was disapproved, for there would be more
appropriate ways to "remove all doubts" concerning whether the list of kinds of income
was intended to be exclusive; in fact, the broadening of the list tends strongly to indicate
that the list was exclusive.
But, in 1939, in Helvering v. Suffolk Co., 104 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 4th 1939), reversing
the Board (supra), this line of cases was disapproved. The court declared that § 119 (a)
merely gives special rules for the treatment of certain income categories; that § 119 (c)
covers the same categories, from outside sources; that unusual kinds (there a tax refund)
are in neither subsection and therefore are covered by § 119 (e), as "items of gross
income . . . other than those specified in subsections (a) and (c)", which are to be

apportioned as provided by regulations. This reasoning had been applied by the Board
in dealing with gains upon sales of personal property (not specifically listed), in Hubert
De Stuers, 26 B. T. A. 201 (1932), and Carding Gill, Ltd., 38 B. T. A. 669 (1938), but
the Board had refused to extend it to more unusual forms of income. See also I. T.
3119, 1937-2 C. B. 227.
If the non-resident alien or foreign corporation is not engaged in business in the
United States and has no office or place of business therein, his or its taxability is further
complicated by the provisions of §§ 211 (a) and 231 (a), new in 1936 and not yet interpreted with respect to judgments. These limit the taxability of income of such taxpayers,
even from sources within the United States, to a patently exclusive list of categories
("interest [except interest on deposits with persons carrying on the banking business],
dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations,
emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income"). Although primarily intended to eliminate the tax upon capital gains of such
taxpayers, which it had been found impossible to collect [see (1936) H. R. REP. No. 2475.
74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 9; (1936) SEN. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22, it may
well be that certain judgments will be held to be excluded thereby.
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If the plaintiff is an assignee, the cause of action is capital, and he must
recover his capital cost before any part of the judgment is taxable to him. 10 5
Before leaving this phase of the subject, it is important to call the attention
of attorneys to the disadvantages of general verdicts and lump sum settlements
covering different kinds of causes of action (i.e., different from an income tax
standpoint, as outlined herein). It is highly desirable to make an apportionment of a settlement when a compromise agreement is made, and to refrain
from joining diverse causes of action or to demand, if local practice permits,
that the jury specify the amount it awards upon each claim. For the burden
'Hyatt Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 1008, 70 Ct. Cl. 443 (1930) ;
Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 10th 1935). Cf. John D. Fackler, 39 B. T. A.
395 (1939).
When the assignee has taken over a number of claims, some of which had been worthless in the hands of the assignor, and the consideration given equals only the value of the
sound claims, the assignee's cost basis is zero for the worthless claims and any recoveries thereon are income, even though neither the assignor nor the assignee had the
benefit of their deduction as'bad debts (see supra note 68). National Bank of Commerce
of Seattle, 40 B. T. A. 72 (1939).
If the claims are acquired by virtue of a transaction in a reorganization, as prescribed in
section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code, no gain or loss is recognized upon that transaction and the assignee takes the cost basis of the assignor [see Internal Revenue Code
§ 113 (a) (7)]. Cf. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, supra.
When a cause of action is transmitted at death, the cost basis to the legatee or distributee is the value at date of death. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 334, 50 Sup. Ct.
115 (1930). The value, for income tax purposes, of a cause of action which has not been
finally and conclusively adjudicated is zero, because it is contingent. United States v.
Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936). Hence, no cost basis is
deductible from the taxable recovery in such a case. J. R. Knowland, 29 B: T. A. 618
(1933). See infra note 125.
The assignee's gain or loss, realized when he collects the claim or gets final judgment
thereon, is not governed by the aapital gain and loss provisions of section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code, for the collection of a debt is not a "sale or exchange" thereof.
I. T. 3121, 1937-2 C. B. 138; cf. Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819, 66 App. D. C.
242 (1936).
If the cause of action is of a taxable nature, the assignor realizes income in the amount
received for the assignment. Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935), aff'd w.
o. op., 83 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 2d 1936). If the claim is of such a nature that a recovery
thereon would be ordinary income rather than capital gain, the income received from a sale
of the cause of action is also ordinary income. Doyle v. Comm'r, 102 F. (2d) 86
(C. C. A. 4th 1939).
Even if the assignment of the cause of action was by gift (in this case, to the taxpayer's
wife), the original owner of the cause of action escapes taxation upon it. Louis Boehm, 35
B. T. A. 1106 (1937) ; but cf. Griffiths v. Helvering, 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939) (vhere tax
evasion was the obvious purpose of the transaction). But, if of a taxable nature, the judgment when obtained will be taxable in full to the donee, except to the extent that it had a
cost basis to the donor. See Internal Revenue Code § 113 (a) (2). If it was assigned to
pay an obligation of, the assignor, presumably income in the amount of the obligation
would be realized at the time of the assignment (assuming a cause of action of taxable
nature) ; but if no actual assignment is found, the original owner of the cause of action
is taxable upon the judgment even though, by his direction or by contract, all or a part of
the proceeds are diverted to the payment of his obligation without passing through his
hands. Newman & Carey Subway Construction Co., 37 B. T. A. 1163 (1938) (taxpayer
agreed with creditor that anything he received in a certain damage suit would be paid upon
the debt, and it was so paid by the attorney collecting it) ; see also Comm'r v. Field, 42 F.
(2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d 1930) (attorney was to get 15% of recovery, by contract, but
no formal assignment of share of cause of action was made; hence taxable in full to
plaintiff; point not discussed).
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of proof is upon the taxpayer to show what portion of the recovery is for the
non-taxable causes of action, and, while the Commissioner's determination
must not be arbitrary, he may resolve all doubts against the taxpayer who fails
in his proof.106 Although the contract of settlement might not be conclusive
if an attempt at evasion were evident, it would seem that a bona fide apportionment by the parties would be strong evidence for the taxpayer who otherwise,
if he settles for a lump sum, faces an impossible problem of proof. 10 7
b.

When taxable

Assuming that the recovery upon a particular cause of action, or some
'Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Ry. v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 6th 1931),
cert. denied, 286 U. S. 557, 52 Sup. Ct. 639 (1932) (court determined from mathematical
relation of claims made, some of which were undisputed, that all of taxpayer's disputed
claim was allowed as part of lump sum, so taxable although as a net result of settlement

taxpayer paid out money); Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 4th
1935) (Commissioner upheld in applying entire settlement to taxable item of claim, since
claim for that item had been larger than the whole recovery and there was no proof
that it was not the only claim allowed); Foley v. Comm'r, 94 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 3d
1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 615, 59 Sup. Ct. 74 (1938) (similar).
But cf. Tunnel R. R. ,v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th 1932) (claim and
counterclaim for same matter, each party claiming balance was in his favor; settlement
wiped slate clean; Commissioner maintained that taxpayer's claim had been allowed and
offset by other items, but court found this entirely unsupported by evidence, declaring it
"sheer guesswork" to say that the adjustment liquidated any particular claims); Ann
Arbor R. R. v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 6th 1938) (by settlement of mutual
claims, taxpayer paid out money, and asserted that this showed that nothing was allowed
upon the claim involved in the tax case, but so to hold would require the assumption that
all its other claims were allowed in full and the particular one disallowed in full; neither
that assumption nor that of the Commissioner, that all of the other party's claims were
allowed in full and set off against the full amount of taxpayer's claim, was justified by the
evidence, for the whole was a compromise; the court rejected both assumptions and
made its own determination from the record).
If there is no doubt that some, at least, of the amount received was of a non-taxable
nature, it cannot all be held taxable merely for lack of exact apportionment, but all
doubts may be resolved against the taxpayer. Cf. [George M.] Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.
(2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), in which Judge Learned Hand declared (with respect
to certain business expenses of which no account had been kept) :
"Absolute certainty in such matters is usually impossible and is not necessary;
the Board should make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it
chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making. But to allow
nothing at all appears to us inconsistent with saying that something was spent....
The amount may be trivial and unsatisfactory, but there was basis for some allowance,
and it was wrong to refuse any ...
It is not fatal that the result will inevitably be
speculative; many important decisions must be such. We think the Board was in error
and must reconsider the evidence."
Cf. also Burnet v. Houston, 283 U. S. 223, 228, 51 Sup. Ct. 413 (1931).
1
'No case has been found in which the apportionment of a settlement by agreement of
the parties was questioned by the Commissioner or specifically considered by the court.
The taxpayer may not avail himself of the common law right of the creditor to make
application of payments if the debtor does not, f6r that relates only to the question of
which claim is extinguished by the payment, whereas by a lump sum settlement all claims
are extinguished. Therefore, the taxpayer cannot bind the Commissioner by his unilateral
act. Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 4th 1935). But the taxpayer
himself may be bound by his bookkeeping entries in apportioning the settlement. Lehigh &
Hudson River Ry. v. Comm'r, 36 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 2d 1929), rood. on other grounds,
38 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 748, 50 Sup. Ct. 353 (1930).
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portion of such recovery, would be taiable as income, at what time does it
become taxable? At first glance, this might seem to be of little importance,
since, in one year or another, it is taxable anyway. But a great volume of
litigation has concerned this problem, because taxpayers seek to report the
recovery as income in a year when the tax rate was lower, or when their
income was in lower brackets of the graduated scale of rates, or when they
had a net loss against which to offset the income-or they seek to escape tax
entirely by assigning the income to a year for which the tax is already barred
by the statute of limitations. 0 8
When the taxpayer makes his return upon the cash receipts and disbursements basis, the problem is relatively simple.' 0 9 The recovery is taxable when
the taxpayer receives cash or the equivalent of cash."10 A negotiable note
received in payment of a claim is the equivalent of cash to the extent of its
fair market value, but only if it is of marketable quality so that the taxpayer could at once convert it into cash if he so elected.", But a judgment is
not the equivalent of cash, for it is not given as property or as payment, and,
while sometimes marketable, it is not negotiable and is sold subject to all
2
defenses existing against the seller."
If a payment on account of a claim or a judgment is for any reason tied up
in escrow or otherwise made unavailable to a taxpayer on the cash basis, it is
3
not income to him until released."1
A payment to the taxpayer's attorney is the equivalent of payment to him,"14
unless the attorney asserts a lien thereon in an unliquidated amount so that it
'This last feat was accomplished in HelVering v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 66 F.
(2d) 633 (C. C. A. 8th 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 626, 54 Sup. Ct. 632 (1934), which
result drew the fire of the dissenting judge. It was also attacked in Maguire and Zimet,
Hobson's Choice and Similar Practicesin FederalTaxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281.
Cf. Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532, 57 Sup. Ct. 851 (1937).
The opportunities for thus escaping taxation will be much reduced, though not entirely
eliminated, by section 820 of the 1938 Act, now Internal Revenue Code, § 3801. The
purpose and effect of this provision are discussed in (1938) SEN. REP. No. 1567, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 48; (1938) H. R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 57-59;
Regulations 101, article 820-1; 1 PAUL

AND MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION

(Supp. 1938) ch. 11A.
l'The cash basis is discussed in Magill, When Is Income Realized? (1933) 46 HARv. L.
REv. 933, 934-940; 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934)
ch. 10 and §§ 11.19 to 11.63.
"Flynn v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; William F. B. Koelle, 7 B. T.
A. 917 (1927) (taxable when check received, not when settlement completed) ; Regulations
101, art. 42-1.
m
Percy K. Hexter, 8 B. T. A. 888 (1927). See also Magill, loc. cit. supra note 109, at
936; Regulations 101, art. 22 (a) -4; I. T. 2046, 111-2 C. B. 56 (1924).
'Kyle v. Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 3d 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 896, 51
Sup. Ct. 181 (1931).
="Walker v. Comm'r, 63 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. 5th 1933); Crews v. Comm'r, 89 F.
(2d) 412 (C. C. A. 10th 1937); Sara R. Preston, 35 B. T. A. 312 (1937). See 1 PAUL
AND4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

(1934) § 11.26.

n Julia A. Strauss, 2 B. T. A. 598 (1925) ; Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B. T. A. 732, 744
(1937).
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is impossible to determine to how much of it, if any, the taxpayer is entitled. 115
When a person reporting on the cash basis receives payments upon a judgment in installments, the payments are applied first to the interest due (which
is taxable) and then any balance is applied upon the principal (which may
or may not be taxable).'16 But if the principal of the judgment is of very
doubtful collectibility, none of the payments will be regarded as interest until
117
the principal has been recovered.
If the taxpayer reports income upon the accrual basis, different principles
apply."18 Income, in that case, becomes taxable when there arises "a fixed
and unconditional right to receive it, if there is a reasonable expectancy that
119
the right will be converted into money or its equivalent".
In certain instances, income may accrue in the year in which a cause of action
arises, if within the taxable year the other party admits liability, even though
the exact amount thereof is left to later negotiations, if there is a reasonable
basis upon which it may be estimated. 120 The estimated income is accrued at
once, subject to correction when the amount due is agreed upon. If the
amount of the liability is litigated, however, even though liability is admitted,
it has been held that income does not accrue until the litigation is finally
121
terminated.
'A. L. Voyer, 4 B. T. A. 1192 (1926). The dissent in this case, however, seems the
better, for the taxpayer's right to receive the income was not contested by the attorney.
Income must be reported in gross; the taxpayer's right to the gross was uncontested, and
it was received for him by his agent. Attorney's fees, if deductible at all on the facts of
the case, are deducted from this gross income, and the dispute with the attorney in that
case concerned this expense item, not the income.
'"Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122, 68 App. D. C. 211 (1938) ; see Helvering v.
Drier, 79 F. (2d) 501, 503 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) ; cf. 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEn-

(1934) § 5.34.
course, be of importance only when the principal of the judgment
as income. Comm'r v. Speyer, 77 F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 2d 1935),
S. 631, 56 Sup. Ct. 155 (1935) ; Helvering v. Drier, 79 F. (2d) 501
; G. C. M. 16166, XV-1 C. B. 175. Cf. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S.
(1931). See PAUL AND MERTENS, loc. cit. supra note 116.

ERAL IxcomE TAXATION
1

" This would, of
is not itself taxable
cert. denied, 296 U.
(C. C. A. 4th 1935)
404, 51 Sup. Ct. 550

"The accrual method is discussed in Magill, When Is Income Realized? (1933) 46
REv. 933, 940; 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcO ME TAXATION
(1934) §§ 11.64 to 11.100; see also H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932, 937
(C. C. A. 9th 1937).
'H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932, 938 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
"Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U. S. 290, 52 Sup. Ct. 529 (1932);
Comm'r v. Old Dominion S. S. Co., 47 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2d 1931); Comnr v.
Midland Valley R. R., 57 F. (2d) 1042 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) ; Helvering v. St. Louis
HARv. L.

Southwestern Ry., 66 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 8th 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 626, 54
Sup. Ct. 632 (1934); Helvering v. Gulf, M. & N. R. R., 71 F. (2d) 953 (App. D. C.
1934), aff'd on other grounds, 293 U. S. 295, 55 Sup. Ct. 161 (1934) ; Southern Ry. v.

Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 4th 1935); Texas & Pacific Ry., 9 B. T. A. 365

(1927) ; Crowinshield Shipbuilding Co., 24 A. T. A. 925 (1931). See Magill, When -Is
Realized? (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 933, 942; note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 948.
Income
tm
United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936) (after

decree, affirmed on appeal, had fixed right to damages for patent infringement, referred to
master to determine damages, which were not determined until years later; held, not
accrued until master's report confirmed) : Patrick McOuirl, Inc. v. Comm'r. 74 F. (2d)
729 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 748, 55 Sup. Ct. 827 (1935) (taxpayer
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But if liability is not admitted, income does not arise from the mere accrual
of a cause of action.122 The income may not be accrued until a settlement is
made1 23 or, if the claim is litigated, until all possible appeals have been taken
or the liability has become final by the expiration of time to appeal from a
judgment for the taxpayer. 24 It is not permissible to relate the recovery back
to the years the profits of which the recovery replaces, or in wfiich were
contested amount awarded for property condemned; since amount, therefore, depended
upon a judicial proceeding involving valuations of experts,- etc., held too indefinite to
accrue) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) (same) ;
First Bancredit Corp. v. Flexlume Corp., 10 F. Supp. 1015 (W. D. N. Y. 1935) (like
Safety Car Heating case). But cf. Comm'r v. Midland Valley R. R., 57 F. (2d) 1042
(C. C. A. 10th 1932), in which the question of the amount of an admitted liability had been
carried to the Court of Claims, yet it was held to accrue when the claim arose; distinguishable in that a statute fixed the basis of compensation, and all the facts from which
the amount of the liability was to be determined were in existence and in the plaintiff's
books.
'="The distinction between the liquidation of a determined right [as in the cases just
discussed], and the determination of a disputed right, is familiar throughout the law,
though for practical purposes one may be as incalculable as the other." Judge Learned
Hand, dissenting, in Comm'r v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 62 F. (2d) 505, 507 (C. C. A.
2d 1933).
"Income... is the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of fruition." Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 99, 56 Sup. Ct. 353
(1936).
A right that is subject to the hazards of litigation is too contingent to be accrued as income. Cf. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 50 Sup. Ct. 202 (1930).
"U. S. Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 511, 52 Sup. Ct. 243 (1932) ; Kentucky
& Indiana Terminal Ry. v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert. denied,
286 U. S. 557, 52 Sup. Ct. 639 (1932); Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. Helvering, 72 F.
(2d) 399 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; Faust v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 676 (1928) ; Gilbert
Butler, 4 B. T. A. 756 (1926) ; Peninsula Shipbuilding Co., 9 B. T. A. 189 (1927) ;
Dexter Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 23 B. T. A. 227 (1931) ; A. M. Campau Realty Co.,
35 B. T. A. 687 (1937) ; Swastika Oil & Gas Co., 40 B. T. A. 797 (1939).
When the taxpayer keeps a down payment for property as damages for breach of a
sale contract, it is income when the right so to retain it is fixed, for until that time it
stands merely as a payment for capital. Dexter Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 23 B. T. A.
227 (1931) ; Harry F. Doyle, 39 B. T. A. 940 (1939) ; cf. Miles Realty Co., 31 B. T. A.
443 (1934) (not income until steps taken to abandon contract and enforce forfeiture for
breach).
"'United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936) (cause
of action arose before 1913, liability determined in 1915, but master's report of damages
not finally confirmed and appeal decided until 1925; held, income in 1925) ; Kales v.
Woodworth, 32 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 570, 50 Sup. Ct.
27 (1929) (suit by Dodge brothers to compel Ford dividend, ordered by lower court
in 1917, stayed pending appeal, affirmed in 1919, at which time dividend was declared as of
date of 1917 decree; held, not income until 1919, for until then it was in the doubtful
realm of litigation); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 4th
1935) (not income until New York Court of Appeals affirmed); H. Liebes & Co. v.
Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932, 938 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) (accrues when judgment entered and
time to appeal expires) ; Dodge v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 178 (1927) (same as Kales
case, supra) ; W. W. Sly Mfg. Co., 24 B. T. A. 65 (1931) (accrued when Supreme Court
denied certiorari); Regulations 101, art. 42-1. Other cases apparently reaching a contrary result must, so far as inconsistent- with the Safety Car Heating case, be considered
overruled. Kyle v. Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 3d 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S.
896, 51 Sup. Ct. 181 (1931) ; Park v. Gilligan, 293 Fed. 129 (S. D. Ohio, 1921); Julia A.
Strauss, 2 B. T. A. 598 (1925) ; C. C. Harris Oil Co., 13 B. T. A. 937 (1928); Niels V.
Christensen, 33 B. T. A. 79 (1935).
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thereby, even though a distortion
incurred the expenses or losses reimbursed
125
of income might be avoided by doing so.
The accrual of interest included in a judgment goes along with the accrual
it
of the principal and may not be spread over the period in respect of which
26
judgment.
final
until
contingent
was
principal,
the
is awarded, for it, like
As a result of the Supreme Court's interpretation 26 of the language of what
is now section 162 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code,'126" a contrary rule has
been developed with respect to trust income when its distributability is contested in court. That section provides that the trustee may deduct and the
beneficiary shall be taxed on income which "is to be distributed currently",
whether distributed or not. It has been held (under all the variations in the
language of the section) that when a subsequent court decree declares that
income withheld by the trustee should have been distributed "currently", it is
taxable to the beneficiaries only in the years when they should have
12 6 °
received it.
'Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931) ; United

States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936) ; Comm'r v.
Southeastern Express Co., 56 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 5th 1932) ; Peninsula Shipbuilding
Co., 9 B. T. A. 189 (1927). Cf. U. S. Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 511, 52
Sup. Ct. 243 (1932).
A different rule seems to apply to recoveries upon insurance which, even though litigated,
are offset against prior losses unless the chance of recovery was very remote at the time.
See supra note 62.
Even though a cause of action existed on March 1, 1913, or at the time it was received
by bequest or inheritance, it had no "value" at that time if it was disputed and hence
not "unconditional", so the whole recovery is income. United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., stupra. The contrary case of Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. Helvering, 72 F. (2d)
399 (C. C. A. 2d 1934), was distinguished by the Supreme Court in the Safety Car Heating case, at p. 98, upon the ground that the claim was not for profits but for out-of-pocket
expenses (which, not having been deducted in the period before 1913, when there was no
tax, are not taxable as income when recovered; but cf. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,
supra, and see supra note 14).
1'American Viscose Corp. v. Comm'r, 56 F. (2d) 1033, 1034 (C. C. A. 3d 1932);
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 4th 1935).
'aIn Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35, 54 Sup. Ct. 308 (1934), under, the 1921 Act.
'-bThis section has undergone several verbal changes, but the interpretation of all the
Acts has been uniform in this respect. Section 2 (b) of the Act of 1916 provided that the
entire income was taxed to the trustee but the rate was made dependent on the individual
shares, so far as the income "is to be distributed annually." Section 219 (d) of the Act of
1918 taxed to the beneficiaries their "distributive share". Section 219 (d) of the Act of
1921 taxed to the beneficiary the income "which pursuant to the instrument or order
governing the distribution is distributable". All subsequent acts have allowed the trustee
a deduction for income which "is to be distributed currently," and taxed to the beneficiary
"the amount so allowed as a deduction".
10McCaughn v. Girard Trust Estate, 19 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 3d 1927) (1916 Act);
United States v. Arnold, 89 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 3d 1937), disapproved on other grounds
in Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532, 57 Sup. Ct. 851 (1937) (1928 Act) ; DeBrabant v.
Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) (1928 Act) ; Albert J. Appel et al., Ex'rs,
10 B. T. A. 1225 (1928) (1916 and 1918 Acts). But see I. T. 1733, 11-2 C. B. 169 (1923)
(1921 Act).
Similarly, when the trustee has distributed income and this is later approved by the
court, the subsequent decree is held conclusive. Letts v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A.
9th 1936) (1926 Act) ; Lawrence Fox et al., Ex'rs, 31 B. T. A. 1181 (1935) (1928 Act).

246

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

128
Unusual methods of accounting, 27 such as the "long-term contract",
1
29
130
"completed voyage",
and "crop" bases, require special mention. Those
methods are used when it would distort net income to report gross income
and expenses even on the accrual basis because the ventures of the taxpayer
are not completed in a single year. Under those methods, the net profit upon
a particular contract, voyage, or crop (which takes more than a year from
commencement to completion) is reported in the year of completion, and a
taxable judgment recovered on account of such a contract, voyage, or crop is
31
not taxable until such time.'
When personal property is transmitted at death, by a general or residuary
bequest or by inheritance, the legal proceedings incident to administration of
the estate delay the acquisition of legal title by the legatee or distributee. Of
course, since such receipts are not taxable as income, 3 2 there is no problem of
when they are taxable. But there is an analogous problem in connection with
the determination of the value at the time of "acquisition"' 1 3 and the period

Similarly, where the trustee's withholding is later approved by a court, the decree is conclusive that the trustee alone is taxable. Hubbell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A.
8th 1934) (1924, 1926 and 1928 Acts) ; Comm'r v. Dean, 102 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 10th
1939) (1928 Act) ; Susan B. Armstrong, 38 B. T. A. 658 (1938) (1932 Act).
When income is actually distributed and a court later decrees that the distribution was
improper and must be restored, the income was never "distributable" to the beneficiary
and is not taxable to him, although he had unrestricted use of it. Freuler v. Helvering,
291 U. S. 35, 54 Sup. Ct. 308 (1934) (1921 Act) ; cf. Marguerite Hyde Suffolk & Berks,
40 B. T. A. No. 172 (Dec. 15, 1939) (1932 and 1934 Acts; holding beneficiary is taxable
on sums later withheld pursuant to a court decree ordering reimbursement, since the
income is then "distributable" although charged with the obligation to restore the trust
corpus; the adjustment in "distributable" income must be made in the returns for the
years when the improper distributions occurred).
'-Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the use of the taxpayer's regular
method of accounting, unless it does not clearly reflect net income.
"-Approved in Regulations 101, art. 42-4; Badgley v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A.
2d 1932). Used particularly in construction contracts taking more ihan a year to perform.
'-'Approved in Planet Line, Inc. v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), aff'g 34
B. T. A. 253 (1936) ; Falketind Ship Co., 6 B. T. A. 44 (1927). Used principally by
single-ship companies whose voyages may consume more than a year.
'-Approved in Kekaha Sugar Co. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 322 (App. D. C. 1931) ; Kahuku
Plantation Co., 12 B. T. A. 977 (1928), mod., 13 B. T. A. 292 (1928). Used for crops
that
take more than a year to mature.
m
'Kahuku Plantation Co., 12 B. T. A. 977 (1928), mzod., 13 B. T. A. 292 (1928);
Waimanalo Sugar Co., 12 B. T. A. 1241 (1928), mod., 13 B. T. A. 323 (1928); Oahu
Sugar Co., 13 B. T. A. 404 (1928) ; Ewa Plantation Co., 13 B. T. A. 625 (1928) (in all
of those cases, damages were awarded for lost profits applicable to part of sugar crop
injured, received in cash, but not taxable as income until subsequent year in which crop
is sold and net profits can be determined upon the crop).
But if the accounts for the contract, voyage, or crop have been closed in a year prior
to the recovery, that year's return may not be reopened to reflect the later recovery upon
a claim which was then contingent. Newman & Carey Subway Constr. Co., 37 B. T. A.
1163 (1938). But cf. Carolina Contracting Co., 32 B. T. A. 1171 (1935). just as under
the accrual method, it is improper to treat as income claims which are contested at the time
of completing the contract, National Contracting Co. v. Comm'r, 105 F. (2d) 488, 495
C. C. A. 8th 1939).
mInternal Revenue Code § 22 (b) (3).
mInternal Revenue Code § 113 (a) (5). This applies not merely to capital gains and
losses but to other losses, depreciation, etc., wherever a value base is used.
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for which an asset has been "held", 3 4 for the purpose of taxation of capital
gains and losses. It is settled that, even though the specific property was not
set aside for the taxpayer until distribution and although he had no certainty
of getting anything, his right to an indeterminate share in the estate vested
at the death of the decedent. The decree of distribution gave him no new
right, merely identifying the property to which his right attached, the legal
title then relating back to the date of death. Hence, the value base of property
so acquired is the value at the date of decedent's death,-3 5 and the tax rate
applicable, which varies with the length of time during which the property has
been held, is dependent upon the time elapsed since that date.'8 8 It appears
that even if the delay in obtaining possession is odcasioned, not merely by the
normal legal proceedings, but by the taxpayer's action to invalidate the
decedent's will (under which he got nothing), nevertheless the date of death
is considered the time when he acquired the property, for purposes of those
137
provisions of law.
Once a taxpayer on the accrual basis has a final judgment or settlement,
income accrues even though actual payment be delayed.138 Nor is it material
that the agreement provides that the settlement shall be called off and the suit
reinstated if payments are not made; for the right to the payments is then
fixed, and a condition subsequent does not prevent accrual of income. 139 The
fact that a judgment against the Federal Government can not be collected
unless and until there is an appropriation available for its payment does not
raise sufficient uncertainty of collection to prevent accrual, for there is a
reasonable expectancy that the claim, once put in judgment by a court, will
be honored by the Congress. 140
'Internal Revenue Code § 117 (a).
'Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 334, 50 Sup. Ct. 115 (1930). Before that decision,
the Congress had decided that the word "acquisition" was too indefinite, and had changed
the section, in the Act of 1928, to fix the controlling date as the date of distribution, except with respect to real property and specific bequests of personal property. But when
Brewster v. Gage showed that the Court was able satisfactorily to define "acquisition"
in all cases in terms of the date of death, the Congress restored the former language, in
the Act of 1934, for the sake of uniformity. (1934) H. R. REP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 28; (1934) SEN. REP. No. 558, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34.
'McFeely v. Comm'r, 296 U. S. 102, 56 Sup. Ct. 54 (1935).
'I. T. 2379, VI-2 C.B. 116 (1927). The ruling dealt with real property, but under
the reasoning of Brewster v. Gage, supra note 135, the same result would follow with
respect to personal property.
3"Lichtenberger-Ferguson Co. v. Welch, 54 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 9th 1931).
'Estate of G. A. E. Kohler, 37 B. T. A. 1019 (1938) ; cf. Helvering v. Russian Finance
& Constr. Corp., 77 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
'H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 9th 1937). Cf. Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) (award of Mixed Claims
Commission against Germany, payment dependent upon continued willingness and ability
of Germany to pay and upon continued cooperation of United States in collecting installments; held accruable, for mere possibility of change in legislative policy is not enough
to make the claim contingent-and later events do not affect accrual).
Among the rare cases in which the Congress has refused to honor a judgment of the
Court of Claims are Pocono Pines Hotels Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 91 (1930), in
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But if there is not a reasonable expectancy that the judgment can be collected in any reasonable time, income does not accrue even though it is entered
upon the taxpayer's books. 141 The requirements for preventing the accrual of
income are thus less stringent than those for deducting debts as worthless
once they have accrued, for less evidence of uncollectibility is required 142 and
143
no charge-off on the books is necessary.
On the other hand, if there was a reasonable expectancy of payment at the
time the right accrued, the income is taxable even though subsequent events
proved the judgment valueless, and the taxpayer must comply with all the
requirements of law respecting charging off bad debts if he desires to deduct
the loss. 1'
It is, of course, impossible here to discuss the complex problems
1 45
involved in the bad debt deduction.
75 CONG. REc. 1306 (1932), s. c., 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932) ; and Dalton v. United States, 71
Ct. Cl. 421 (1931), in 75 CONG. REc. 1233, 1307 (1932) and 79 CONG. REc. 10816 (1935).
'Corn Exchange Bank v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 34 (C. C. A. 2d 1930) ; Helvering
v. Drier, 79 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 4th 1935) ; Great Northern Ry., 8 B. T. A. 225, 265
(1927), aff'd on other grounds, 40 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S.
855, 51 Sup. Ct. 17 (1930); Northwestern Improvement Co., 14 B. T. A. 79 (1928);
Sowers Mfg. Co., 16 B. T. A. 268 (1929); American Cigar Co., 21 B. T. A. 464 (1930),
aff'd on other grounds, 66 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 699, 54
Sup. Ct. 209 (1933) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 31 B. T. A. 730, 747 (1934), aff'd on
other grounds, 81 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 4th 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 656, 56 Sup.
Ct. 676 (1936) ; American Central Utilities Co., 36 B. T. A. 688 (1937) ; Marguerite Hyde
Suffolk & Berks, 40 B. T. A. No. 172 (Dec. 15, 1939); G. C. M. 9466, X-1 C. B. 133
(1931).
'Corn Exchange Bank v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 34, 35 (C. C. A. 2d 1930).
"American Central Utilities Co., 36 B. T. A. 688 (1937) (taxpayer entered the
income in its books and did not write it off, but it was held that book entries cannot make
that income which in fact is not income).
'"Llewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U. S. 243, 48 Sup. Ct. 63 (1927) ; Spring
City Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 292 U. S. 182, 54 Sup. Ct. 644 (1934) (debtor bankrupt in
same year claim accrued; held, taxable on income; and failed to meet requirements for
deducting bad debts); American Cigar Co. v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 699, 54 Sup. Ct. 209 (1933) ; Peyton Dupont Securities Co.
v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 2d 1933); Automobile Insurance Co. v. Comm'r,
72 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122, 68 App. D. C.
211 (1938); Finucane v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 122, 85 Ct. Cl. 663 (1937);
Broderick v. Anderson, 23 F. Supp. 488 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
'See 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934) ch. 28; PAUL,
Suggested Modification of the Bad Debts Provision in STUDIEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION

(1937) 235 (reprinted from (1937) 22
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Q. 196).

Excellent recent discussions of the whole problem by the courts may be found in
Sabath v. Comm'r, 100 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 7th 1938) ; Moore v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d)
704 (C. C. A. 2d 1939); Comm'r v. MacDonald Engineering Co., 102 F. (2d) 942
(C. C. A. 7th 1939) ; see also Duffin v. Lucas, 55 F. (2d) 786, 795 (C. C. A. 6th 1932),
cert. denied, 287 U. S. 611, 53 Sup. Ct 14 (1932).
The mere running of the Statute of Limitations upon a debt or a judgnient does not
conclusively establish worthlessness, if other circumstances indicate that the defense would
not be raised. Duffin v. Lucas, supra; Comm'r v. Burdette, 69 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 9th
1934) ; Leo Stein, 4 B. T. A. 1016 (1926) ; Warner L. Colvert, 6 B. T. A. 623 (1927) ;
Alfred K. Nippert et al., Exec'rs, 32 B. T. A. 892 (1935) ; 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, Op. Cit.
supra, § 28.59. On the other hand, the taxpayer may not refrain from charging off the
debt until the Statute runs if in fact it is worthless prior thereto. Sabath v. Comm'r,
supra. In H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 10th 1935),
the court declared that no deduction could be had for a claim against a solvent debtor

INCOME TAX ON GAINS IN LITIGATION
The principle that income does not accrue upon a litigated claim until there
is a final judgment from which no further appeal may be taken, must be
qualified. For if, in fact, the plaintiff receives the income before that time, or
if it is made available to him, he is taxable even though he may later have to
restore the equivalent if his action is ultimately unsuccessful. This results
from the rule, laid down by the Supreme Court, that income received under
claim of right and without restriction upon its disposition is taxable when so
received.1 4 6 Therefore, if the successful plaintiff obtains payment, he is
taxable upon the amount thus obtained, regardless of whether the defendant
appeals.1 4 7 Or if he assigns his cause of action or judgment before his right
becomes finally fixed thereunder, he is then taxable upon the consideration
received, whether or not he is contingently liable upon a guarantee that it will
be affirmed and collected.1 48 Attachment or garnishment prior to the final
determination of the litigation does not constitute receipt of income, however,
for it is not "received without restriction upon its disposition". 49 And if paywhich the taxpayer by his own delay has allowed to lapse; it was, however, a dictum.
A remote possibility that a suit by minority stockholders against the taxpayer's
directors, charging fraud in connection with the debt, may recoup the loss for the
taxpayer does not prevent a charge-off. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 13 B. T. A. 988 (1928),
rev'd on other grounds, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618,
52 Sup. Ct. 7 (1931).
The fact that the dpbtor makes a claim of set-off does not render the obligation worthless. Hamler Coal Co., 4 B. T. A. 947 (1926) ; Bula. E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933).
When taxpayer drops a suit against a solvent debtor because of the difficulty and
expense which it would entail, on the advice of counsel, it may be that the debt may then
be charged off. The court in Harmount v. Comm'r, 58 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th 1932),
avoided opinion on this question because of insufficient evidence that circumstances were
any different in that year than for years before.

'-'North American Oil Co. v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932).

This

will
be more fully discussed in Part Two.
17
' Cf. North American Oil Co. v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932), and
Comm'r v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 62 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 2d 1933), in which the
defendant's right to certain income was contested and the income was impounded; upon
getting judgment in the lower court, it was released, and it was held taxable although it
might have to be restored after an appeal; in the latter case, a bond had to be given
in order to get the income, but this did not affect its taxability.
But cf. Alamitos Land Co., 40 B. T. A. 353 (1939), where the plaintiff was paid,
pending an appeal by the defendant, but held the funds in a segregated account which was
not used by it; the Board found that by the law of the state, upon receiving anything
upon a judgment before the time to appeal expires or before an appeal is determined, the
plaintiff holds as trustee until the right is finally determined, and hence it was not received
"without restriction upon its disposition".
The gain realized by a conditional seller upon a foreclosure sale may not be held in
suspense pending the outcome of litigation between the parties over his right thereto.
R. A. Rowan & Co., 13 B. T. A. 975 (1928). But cf. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 33
B. T. A. 512, 522 (1935), aff'd on other grounds, 89 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U. S. 698, 58 Sup. Ct. 16 (1937) (pledgee was notified that pledged securities
had been embezzled by pledgor; court later decreed that pledgee must give up proceeds,
he having meanvhile disposed of securities; held that income was not realized when
securities were sold, even though he claimed right to it, upon the theory that taxpayer
was constructive trustee and never got title to it).
' Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935), aff'd w. o. op., 83 F. (2d) 1022
(C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'"A. M. Campau Realty Co., 35 B. T. A. 687 (1937).
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ments are tied up in escrow pending final outcome of the litigation, the rule
likewise does not apply. 150
When a plaintiff loses his action or settles a claim for less than he had
demanded, or gets a judgment for less, it is not often that a deductible loss is
sustained. For in most instances a cause of action has no cost basis from
which a loss could be determined. A cause of action in the hands of an
assignee might, of course, have a cost basis to him;151 and under certain
circumstances income might have been properly accrued before the dispute
arose, so that there would be a cost which must be recovered.' 52 Or the claim
may have capital elements which would give it a cost, if it is claim for money
loaned or advanced. 158 In those cases, since the settlement or judgment is
a closed transaction, exhausting all means of collecting the claim, the loss,
if any, is deductible without regard to the requirements respecting bad debts.""
The loss is an ordinary loss, not subject to the special provisions of law
respecting capital losses,155 for the payment of a claim by the debtor is not a
"'sale or exchange" thereof; the claim is extinguished rather than transferred. 156 A corporation may deduct a loss of any kind, 157 but an individual
must fit his loss into the category either of business losses or losses incurred
in a transaction entered for profit. 1 58

Hence, a loss upon the compromise of

a claim of a personal nature is not deductible. 159
But, in the normal case, no deductible loss is sustained when the plaintiff
'°Cf. Crews v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 10th 1937); Sara R. Preston, 35
B. T. A. 312 (1937). Cf. also Alamitos Land Co., supra note 147.
'Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) ; Hyatt Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 1008, 70 Ct. CI. 443 (1930). See supra note 105.
'Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819, 66 App. D. C. 242 (1936) ; George C. Peterson
Co., 1 B. T. A. 690 (1925) ; Russell Wheel & Foundry Co., 3 B. T. A. 1168 (1926). But if
the income was accrued improperly, because disputed at the time, no deductible loss occurs
when the plaintiff fails to recover it by suit. National Contracting Co. v. Comm'r, 105
F. (2d) 488, 495 (C. C. A. 8th 1939).
"Llewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U. S.243, 48 Sup. Ct. 63 (1927) ; American
Cigar Co., 21 B. T. A. 464 (1930), aff'd on other grounds, 66 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S.699, 54 Sup. Ct. 209 (1933).
If the settlement covers a counterclaim asserted by the other party, the loss may
nevertheless be deductible, if the counterclaim is of a kind which would be deductible
(see Part Two). George C. Peterson Co., 1 B. T. A. 690 (1925); Russell Wheel &
Foundry Co., 3 B. T. A. 1168 (1926) ; but cf. Hamler Coal Co., 4 B. T. A. 947 (1926),
and Bula E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933) (not deductible as bad debt).
'American Cigar Co., 21 B. T. A. 464 (1930), aff'd on other grounds, 66 F. (2d) 425
(C. C. A. 2d 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 699, 54 Sup. Ct. 209 (1933).
'See Internal Revenue Code § 117, dealing with gains and losses upon the "sale or
exchange" of capital assets.
'Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819, 66 App. D. C. 242 (1936) ; Bingham v. Comm'r,
105 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 2d 1939); James R. Stewart, 39 B. T. A. 87; Charles T.
Carlson, 39 B. T. A. 185 (1939), vacating 38 B. T. A. 1361 (1938).
'Internal Revenue Code § 23 (f).
'Internal Revenue Code § 23 (e). It plainly is not the third type of allowable loss,
a loss of property from "casualty". Cf. Fred J.Hughes, 1 B. T. A. 944 (1925).
'Thomas v. Comm'r, 100 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; cf. Long v. Comm'r, 96 F.
(2d) 270 (C. C. A. 9th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S.616, 59 Sup. Ct. 74 (1938).
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loses his suit or gets less than he had demanded. If the claim is for something
strictly in the nature of income-lost profits, and the like-it, of course, has
no cost basis; the failure to receive expected income, therefore, is not a loss.160
Likewise, if the claim represents expenses incurred in the past, the settlement
or loss of the action merely prevents profitable utilization of those expenses,
and since the expenses were deductible when incurred, they may not again be
deducted when the taxpayer fails to recover them.161 And when he sues to
recoup a loss from fire, embezzlement, or similar causes, the loss may be
deducted only when the wrong occurred, and (whether or not deducted at that
time) no deduction may be taken at the conclusion of the litigation. 6 - In
certain circumstances, too, a claim (which has a cost basis and might otherwise
the cost
be deductible) may arise from a capital expenditure, to be added 6to
3
of the property to which it relates rather than currently deducted.'
Mere failure to sue upon a claim, however, has been held not to give rise
to a deductible loss, even though the claim had a cost and all possibility of
collection had vanished ;'1but a different result might follow if good business
reasons, such as the cost and difficulty of suit, were established for the failure
to sue. 165
'Comm'r v. John Thatcher & Son, 76 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) ; S. M. 2285,
111-2
C. B. 87 (1924).
1
"Comm'r v. John Thatcher & Son, 76 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) ; S. M. 2285,
111-2 C. B. 87 (1924).
'-Comm'r v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 7th 1934), cert. denied, 293

U. S. 626, 294 U. S. 731, 55 Sup. Ct. 346, 505 (1935) (suit for damages for causing fire;
held, loss sustained at time of fire, not when lost suit) ; Hinrichs v. Helvering, 95 F. (2d)
117, 68 App. D. C. 206 (1938) (fraudulent stock sale, stock worthless in 1930, sued
defrauder and lost in 1934; held, loss in 1930) ; Peterson Linotyping Co., 10 B. T. A. 542
(1928) (embezzlement in 1914, sued embezzler; embezzler bankrupt in 1921, taxpayer
claims bad debt; but cause of action for embezzlement was not a debt; it was a loss, which
must be taken when "sustained", i. e., when embezzlement occurred). But cf. Douglas
County Light & Water Co. v. Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 9th 1930).
But the Board has applied a different rule to recoveries upon insurance, because of its
view that a loss covered by insurance is "compensated" even though liability is disputed.
So a compromise of an insurance claim for less than the amount demanded (if that amount
had been treated as "compensation" for the loss) results in a loss of the difference at that
time, Rose Licht, 37 B. T. A. 1096 (1938).
"'Wadsworth Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 44 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d 1930) (building
contractor defaulted, taxpayer completed work at greater cost than the contract price,
and sued contractor and surety, but unable to collect; not a debt, hence not deductible
as such; and his expenses in completing the building were expenditures for a capital
asset, not deductible either when spent or when found uncollectible; court distinguishes
cases in which, having paid the contractor, the taxpayer then is compelled to redeem the
property from the liens of subcontractors, the double payment resulting in a present loss) ;
H. R. MacMillan, 14 B. T. A. 1367 (1929), appeal dismissed, 67 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A.
9th 1934) (taxpayer purchased judgment from his transferor's creditor, who had threatened to sue to set aside the transfer as fraudulent; judgment proved worthless; payment
was made to remove a cloud upon taxpayer's title and is a capital expense rather than an
ordinary business expense; however, it is suggested in the opinion that proof of worthlessness might make it deductible as a bad debt).
2"H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) ; cf.
Harmount v. Comm'r, 58 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th 1932).
21See Harmount v. Comm'r, 58 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th 1932).
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c. Summary
A recovery in litigation is taxable as income if a voluntary payment of the
claim would have been taxable, or if the recovery is of damages taldng the
place of lost income. Damages for injury to capital or for the conversion
thereof are not taxable as income except to the extent that the recovery exceeds
the cost basis of the property it replaces, but if the loss of the property has
already given rise to a deduction of its cost, the recoupment of the loss is
taxable in full; refunds of taxes previously deducted are, however, differently
treated. Amounts received in settlement of a will contest are not income.
Recoveries in actions of a personal nature (personal injuries, libel and
slander, marital actions, etc.) are not taxable.
If the recovery in a particular cause of action is taxable, it is so taxed when
received, if the taxpayer is on the cash receipts basis, while if he is on the
accrual basis the recovery is taxable when his rights become fixed and unconditional, either by a contract of settlement or by the obtaining of a final and
conclusive judgment upon which no further appeals are possible. But income
does not accrue if there is no reasonable expectancy of collecting upon the
judgment. On the other hand, if the plaintiff receives payment before the
judgment is thus final, he is taxable upon it even though he may have to repay
it at a later date. When the plaintiff loses in an action, or receives less than
his demand, he suffers a deductible loss only to the extent that his claim bad
a cost to him.

